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FEDERAL AGENCY-LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAND USE
NEGOTIATIONS: VULNERABILITIES OF
THE FEDERAL BARGAINING POSITION
LYN LOYD CRESWELL*
The federal government owns nearly one third of all property in the
United States,' with many parcels located in or adjacent to urban or
rural communities. The activities conducted by federal agencies on
these lands can lead to conflicts between a federal agency attempting to
implement a national program2 and a local government seeking to pro-
* B.A., Brigham Young University (1972); J.D. University of Utah (1979)
(associate editor, Utah Law Review); L.L.M. (Land Use Management and Control),
George Washington University (1986). The author is presently a land use planning and
legislation attorney at the U.S. Marine Corps headquarters in Washington, D.C. An
earlier version of this Article was accepted in satisfaction of the Master of Laws degree
requirements of the National Law Center, the George Washington University.
1. Currently, federally-owned property includes some 705 million acres of surface
onshore lands and an estimated 560 million acres of sea floor on the Outer Continental
Shelf to a depth of 200 meters. In addition, the federal government owns about 66
million acres of reserved mineral interests in private or state owned lands. The total
acreage of federal ownership has not changed much in the past two or three decades,
other than in Alaska. There, grants of federal land to the state under the Statehood Act
and to natives in Alaska under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act have reduced
federal ownership by about 80 million acres over the past twenty years. Hagenstein,
The Federal Lands Today: Uses and Limits, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 74,
76 (S. Brubaker ed. 1984). One of the more controversial issues relating to these lands is
whether federal agencies have a duty or "public trust" to conserve and enhance natural
resources. See generally Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Jampoler, The Navy as Neighbor, PROCEEDINGS U.S. NAVAL INST. 51
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tect a uniquely local concern.3
(Sept. 1982) (detailing a local government's opposition to a military housing project);
Dobbs, Battling Over Access in the Shrinking West: Private Owners Block Users of Pub-
lic Land, Washington Post, June 23, 1987, at A3, col. 1; Trumbull, Suit Seeks Removal
of Cross at Honolulu's Marine Base, N.Y. Times, Sept. 30, 1986, at A28, col. 5; Kramer,
Forest Service Site Violates County Zone Code, Steamboat Pilot (Colorado), Jan. 30,
1986; Rise in Marijuana on U.S. Land, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1984, at A26, col. 6. This
Article focuses on the direct federal activities on federal lands, rather than on commer-
cial enterprises carried out on federal property. For a discussion of the latter topic, see
Freyfogle, Federal Lands and Local Communities, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 653 (1985). The
leading case on state authority over nonfederal activities on federal lands is California
Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987).
Nearly every day federal agency land managers make important decisions which have
potential spillover effects on local communities. Such decisions include, but are not
limited to, whether to locate a hazardous waste storage facility near a community popu-
lation center; whether to use the federal eminent domain power to condemn private
property thereby displacing families or local businesses; whether to expand the use of a
federal prison or military brig to include a larger number of serious offenders; whether
to control mosquitoes which breed on federal property and what type of chemicals, if
any, should be used to control mosquitoes, vectors and other pests; whether to allow or
deny the expanded use of a federal air field to include civilian as well as federal aviation
operations; whether to construct large scale employment centers which would greatly
increase vehicle traffic in a geographic area; whether to change federal air field flight
patterns or increase flight operations thereby creating noise impacts on a greater
number of community residences; whether to allow or deny access to federal lands for
recreational use; whether to limit access to aggregate sources on federal property where
local aggregate supplies have become depleted; where to locate and under what condi-
tions to operate military artillery and bombing ranges; where to locate ammunition stor-
age facilities; whether to demolish or rehabilitate an older, possibly historically-
significant, building; what level of protection should be given to archaeological sites or
historic districts; what volume of water should be removed from underground water
sources; whether to dam up a river thereby inundating valuable agricultural or historic
property and reducing the flow of sand and sediment necessary for beach replenishment;
whether to conduct activities which would damage the habitat of wildlife designated by
state or federal agencies as endangered, threatened, or otherwise protected; what level of
treatment will be provided for sewage generated on federal lands; whether to locate
mobile home parks or multiple-family housing units near community single family resi-
dential neighborhoods; whether to support state, local or federal law enforcement efforts
to control the flow of illegal aliens across federal property; whether to support or dis-
courage state plans for the construction of major highways across federal property;
what controls will be placed on the sale and distribution of alcohol on federal lands;
what controls will be placed on the sale and distribution of "adult literature"; and what
construction and design standards will be applied to buildings and other structures on
federal property.
While this Article focuses on lands owned by the United States, similar problems
occur in dealing with activities on native american lands. Allen, Who Should Control
Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987).
3. The existence of conflicts between federal agencies and local governments is com-
mon. See L. BROWN, MANAGING CONFLICr AT ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES
[Vol. 33:3
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LAND USE NEGOTIATIONS
This Article examines the negotiating position of federal agencies in
their confrontations with local governments over the uses of federal
property. The interaction between federal agencies and communities is
more accurately characterized as a negotiation process, rather than a
legal process. The latter concept implies reliance on substantive law
(the "merits" of a case) and on procedural law (the legally-imposed
principles of fair play). But, conflicts between local governments and
federal agencies over federal land use are most often resolved in the
broader public or political area of negotiation, which includes but is
not limited to legal rules. Law in this context is often an important
(1983). Conflicts can be expected where government establishes jurisdictional bounda-
ries between units of government. Murphy, Jurisdictional Boundaries and Areawide De-
cision Making, in URBAN PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC POLICY 19 (R. Lineberry & L.
Masotti eds. 1975). Due to certain customs developed within our federal system each
political unit views itself as competing with other governmental organizations. D. AL-
LENSWORTH, THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF URBAN PLANNING (1975); Susskind, Citi-
zen Participation and Consensus Building in Land Use Planning, in THE LAND USE
POLICY DEBATE IN THE UNITED STATES 183 (J. de Nevfville ed. 1981). One important
reason for this competition is the fact that each governmental entity has a different view
of what is in the best interest of the public. See Harvey, Uses and Limits of the Federal
Lands Today, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 108, 110-14 (S. Brubaker ed.
1984).
Of course, local governments enter negotiations with the Federal Government with a
well-established history of land-use control authority. See P. GOIST, FROM MAIN
STREET TO STATE STREET: TOWN, CITY, AND COMMUNITY IN AMERICA (1977); IN-
TRODUCTION TO PLANNING HISTORY IN THE UNITED STATES (D. Krueckeberg ed.
1983); Gerckens, Historical Development of American City Planning, in THE PRACTICE
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 21 (S. Frank ed. 1979); Myers, Community-Rele-
vant Measurement of Quality of Life: A Focus on Local Trends, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 108
(1987). But, local government land use planning has had to overcome certain inherent
weaknesses, including "the chumminess, informality, and dealmaking qualities of local
government." Rose, New Models for Local Land Use Decisions, 79 Nw. U.L. REV.
1155, 1171 (1985). The effectiveness of local land use control can be increased by a
local government's adherence to the principles of comprehensiveness, adequate commu-
nication of intentions, well-defined goals and commitment to decisive management ac-
tion. Rider, Local Government Planning: Prerequisites of an Effective System, 18 URB.
AFF. Q. 271 (1982).
Naturally, if a community could regulate its property in isolation, local values and
traditions could be protected. However, with the rapid growth of suburbs after World
War II nearly all communities have dealt with the spillover impacts from neighboring
communities and from state and federal lands. See generally, R. PLATT, INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF FLOODPLAINS (1980); Corrie, An Assessment of the
Role of Local Government in Environmental Regulation, 5 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y 145 (1986); Stonecrush, Local Policy Analysis and Autonomy: On Intergovern-
mental Relations and Theory Specifications, 5 COMP. URB. RESEARCH 5 (1978); Walker,
Intergovernmental Relations and the Well-Governed City: Cooperation, Confrontation,
Clarification, 75 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 65 (1986).
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tool of the negotiators,4 but the parties may rely on various negotiating
strategies to further their interests.5
In this larger bargaining environment, the federal government is not
always the dominant party. Many local governments, like other spe-
cial interest groups in the nation, have learned to exploit the erosion of
the federal agencies' preemptive powers which occurred during the
1970's. During that decade, Congress passed legislation concerning in-
tergovernmental consultation and environmental protection which re-
stricted or conditioned the federal government's use of its land
resources. These and other statutes increased outside access to govern-
ment decisionmaking and established a public policy of greater disclo-
sure of federal agency information. While these statutes alone may not
significantly curtail federal agency discretion, their use by special inter-
est groups in the negotiating process can have a marked impact on the
exercise of federal authority.
4. During the 1970's, for example, public interest groups succeeded in attracting the
attention of federal agencies through court actions. L. WENNER, THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL DECADE IN COURT (1982). This litigation often sharply focused the conflicting
public policy concerns in land use control. W. ROSENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLI-
TICS AND POLICY (1985). In any event, environmental law suits brought by interest
groups, including local governments, redefine federalism in the United States. See L.
LAKE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: THE POLITICAL EFFECTs OF IMPLEMENTA-
TION 7-37, 83-123 (1982).
5. To appreciate the nature of this haggling between federal agencies and local gov-
ernments, one must first consider the role of municipalities and other community-level
governments in the American political system. S. ELKIN, CITY AND REGIME IN THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1987); Gittel, The American City: A National Priority or an
Expendable Population, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 13 (1985); Long, The Citizenships: Local,
State and National, 23 URB. AFF. Q. 4 (1987) (arguing for a stronger role for cities as
advocates for citizen rights). Most political scientists consider local governments to be
important participants in public policy formulation. One commentator suggested that
intergovernmental relations between the federal government and the state and local gov-
ernments form a "fourth branch" of government. Edner, Intergovernmental Policy De-
velopment: The Importance of Problem Definition, in PUBLIC POLICY MAKING IN A
FEDERAL SYSTEM 149 (C. Jones & R. Thomas eds. 1976). In their unique political
role, local governments often act as special interest groups in their efforts to control
federal agency decisionmaking. Of course, federal agencies frequently respond to any
outside pressure by adopting similar pressure-group tactics in guarding their agency
mission. Freeman, Bureaucracy in Pressure Politics, in BUREAUCRATIC POWER IN NA-
TIONAL POLITICS 23 (F. Rouke ed. 1965). See also R. DENTON & G. WOODWARD,
POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN AMERICA 98-136 (1985) (discussing conflicts between
public agencies and interest groups). Of course, not all commentators agree that impor-
tant public policy decisions should be made through the political process. See, e.g.,
Dennis & Simmons, From Illusion to Responsibility: Rethinking Regulation of Federal
Lands, in CONTROVERSIES IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 65 (S. Kamieniecki, R.
O'Brien & M. Clarke eds. 1986).
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The focus of this Article is on the federal government's vulnerabili-
ties when it attempts to preempt or override local community con-
cerns. While the Article should give local governments a clearer view
of how to engage a federal agency in the negotiating process, the author
does not advocate local control of federal land. Rather, the author
believes that increased understanding of land use conflict resolution
will lead to decisions more closely approximating the public need. This
Article should aid federal officers in identifying the risks of taking an
unyielding position when confronted by local community leaders. In
practice, the federal government is seldom able to utterly preempt or
exclude local governments from federal land use decisions affecting a
local community. In fact, a federal officer who espouses a contrary
view will ultimately lose credibility within his agency and with others
outside his organization. This loss of credibility will impair the of-
ficer's subsequent ability to play a significant role in the land use deci-
sionmaking process.
This Article first describes the legal principles which have histori-
cally governed the control of private and public land use in the United
States. These rules of law are changing because of the increased pres-
sures along jurisdictional boundaries between local governments and
other governmental entities, such as neighboring local governments,
and state and federal lands. A hallmark of the judicial and legislative
changes to the traditional rules of law is the emphasis on making gov-
ernment agencies more responsive to public interests.6
Notwithstanding this obligation to the public, public officials are
players in a competitive bargaining environment which often sharply
penalizes them for open and conciliatory conduct. But, an analysis
which focuses solely on the moral or ethical consequences of a decision
is as limited as one which examines only the applicable rules of law. In
practice, the federal agency expects the officer to be an advocate for the
interests of his agency in an atmosphere of intense political bargaining
with local governments and other special interest organizations. Sup-
6. For a general discussion of the dilemmas facing a federal agency decisionmaker,
see Verkuil, The Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV.
258 (1978). The reluctance of public officials to share or disclose information has been
referred to as a hallmark of land use decisionmaking. Ingram, Information Channels
and Environmental Decision Making, 13 NATURAL RESOURCES J. 150 (1973). Of
course, there is general agreement that government ought to be responsive to the people.
There are, however, wide-ranging views about how that responsiveness ought to occur.
See Saltzstein, Conceptualizing Bureaucratic Responsiveness, 17 AD. & Soc'Y 283
(1985).
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posedly, adversarial debate will produce a result which is in the best
interest of the public.
This Article will accent the vulnerabilities of federal agencies in their
negotiations with local governments over land use issues. Among
those vulnerabilities is the failure of key federal decisionmakers to ap-
preciate the nature of the competitive negotiating environment in
which they operate. A federal officer who focuses exclusively on the
legal or ethical aspects of a conflict may be disadvantaged in influenc-
ing the final outcome of the solution. This discussion will also pinpoint
for local governments the chinks in the federal armor and may lead to
the recognition of opportunities for leverage in the negotiating process.
I. LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LAW: ROOTS OF THE
COMMUNITY BARGAINING POSTURE
Any discussion of federal-local land use conflicts must first survey
the rules of law associated with both local land use regulations and the
federal preemptive power. While municipal officials are well ac-
quainted with local government land use control law, they are usually
unfamiliar with the federal constitutional and statutory law. Similarly,
a federal officer well-versed in federal legal practice may be unaware of
the local government legal tradition. In this author's opinion, the fail-
ure of officers on both sides to understand the law in its historical con-
text will cause an imbalance in the discussions preceding a federal land
use decision.
For example, legal limitations under federal law may be used by lo-
cal governments to restrict the federal government's ability to domi-
nate the negotiating process. Federal statutory law obligates federal
agencies to disclose certain government information and to cooperate
with local governments. A local government which fails to recognize
the requirements of these federal laws may too easily concede to a fed-
eral agency position.
Another reason to understand the other side's legal tradition is to
anticipate the public posturing of the other side. Public agencies often
use rules of law to defend their position or to influence public opinion.
An important factor in any intergovernmental negotiation is the poten-
tial influence of the general public. At the beginning of any bargaining,
the public agency negotiator should determine which aspects of the ne-
gotiation may cause outsiders such as the public to favor one side. In
land use conflicts between federal agencies and local governments, the
federal government may be vulnerable, given the strong tradition of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/2
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local control of land use in the United States. Perceptive local leaders,
aware of the public's traditional reliance on local government control
of land and of its unfamiliarity with federal concerns, may successfully
manipulate public opinion to their advantage.
A discussion of federal agency-local government land use contro-
versy must review the well-established principles associated with mu-
nicipal zoning and land use planning.7 Both state and federal courts
recognize the tradition of community land use control, based on the
police powers reserved by the states under the United States Constitu-
tion. This legal tradition has created a perception that counties and
municipalities are in a better position to regulate those aspects of land
use associated with the public health, safety, welfare, and morals. Ad-
ditionally, local governments have learned to solve interjurisdictional
conflicts within their states under state statutory law and state court
judicial precedent. Although federal law may preempt these local and
state laws, a local government official's familiarity with these legal
rules will influence his private and public negotiating positions. Any
federal land manager who wants to control controversial activities on
federal property, but fails to appreciate local government legal and
political tradition, risks making damaging errors of judgment in the
negotiation process.
A. The Tradition and Practice of Local Government Land Use
Planning and Control
Historically, local governments were responsible for land use control
of private land in the United States. Despite recent attempts by the
states and the federal government to regulate private land,' local gov-
7. While this section relies heavily on appellate court decisions to define the tradi-
tion of local government land use control, the reader should remember that not all
courts are impressed by arguments asserting historical or traditional governmental
functions. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). Thus,
the more successful use of the tradition argument may be in the political arena, instead
of in the courts.
8. The environmental movement of the 1970's brought with it an effort to shift con-
trol over land development to the states. Hawaii enacted state land-use control legisla-
tion in 1961 and a few other states followed during the early 1970's. Two
commentators characterized this development as a "quiet revolution" in land-use con-
trol. F. BOSSELMAN & D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CON-
TROL (1971). See also R. HEALY & T. ROSENBERG, LAND USE AND THE STATES (2d
ed, 1979); RABE, FRAGMENTATION AND INTEGRATION IN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT (1986); DeGrove & Stroud, State Land Planning and Regulation: Inno-
vative Roles in the 1980s and Beyond, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Mar. 1987, at 3;
1988)
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ernments continue to exercise a predominant role. One reason for the
continued reliance on local control of real property is the belief that
any decision to restrict the use of private property should provide indi-
vidual landowners with a meaningful opportunity to state their con-
cerns about government control. Advocates of continued local control
assert that landowners' most effective participation in the decisionmak-
ing process is at the local level.9
The traditional method to limit the use of land is through zoning
Knapp, Self-interest and Voter Support for Oregon's Land Use Controls, 53 J. AM. PLAN
A. 92 (1987); Renz, The Coming of Age of State Environmental Policy Acts, 5 PUB.
LAND L. REV. 31 (1984). Many states have limited state environmental land-use con-
trol statutes for sensitive areas such as wetlands and floodplains. E.g., ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 45-2341 to -2367 (Supp. 1985) (floodplains); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 403.916-932 (West 1986) (wetlands); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.261-.281 (West
Supp. 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13.9A (West 1979) (wetlands).
Only four states, Hawaii, Florida, Oregon and Vermont, now have state land-use
control programs that cover more than environmental problems. In Healy & Rosen-
berg, supra, at 7-10, the authors list four reasons for state assumption of control over
land use.
1. Many land-use problems spill across the boundaries of local governments.
2. Often, there are conflicts between the interests of a community and the inter-
ests of a larger and broader jurisdiction.
3. Many local governments in undeveloped areas of a state or region lack effec-
tive land use control.
4. State investments in public works projects have an important influence on
local and regional land development.
Of course, local governments bitterly oppose state involvement in land use control.
See F. POPPER, THE POLITICS OF LAND-USE REFORM (1981).
In addition to state involvement, Congress proposed but failed to adopt a National
Land Use Policy Act in 1975. The most active involvement of the federal government
in land use planning at this time is in the planning requirements under the National
Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1985). See Eichen-
berg & Archer, The Federal Consistency Doctrine: Coastal Zone Management and New
Federalism, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 9 (1987).
9. See J. BALDWIN, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT (1985) (ad-
vocating continued local control because it allows the greatest opportunity for citizen
participation); Johnson, Citizen Participation in Local Planning, 2 GOV'T & POL'Y 1
(1984); Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local
Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837 (1983). But, there are those who contend that land
use planning and control should be more centralized. Delogu, Local Land Use Controls:
An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 36 ME. L. REV. 261 (1984); Hicks, National Urban
Land Policy: Facing the Inevitability of City and Regional Evolution, in URBAN LAND
POLICY FOR THE 1980's 21 (G. Lefcoe ed. 1983). But the traditional wisdom is that
fragmented policymaking is an important ingredient of American political philosophy.
Ingram & Ullery, Policy Innovation and Institutional Fragmentation, 8 POL'Y STUD. 1.
664 (1980); Sabatier & Peckey, Incorporating Multiple Actors and Guidance Instruments
into Models of Regulatory Policymaking, 19 AD. & Soc'Y 236 (1987). See also Kelly,
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ordinances.'° These locally enacted laws establish the authorized uses
of property and the physical configuration of development within a
community's boundaries. The community's authority to pass such or-
dinances is based on the police power delegated to local governments
by the states. 1 Each state has a statute that establishes the substantive
limits and procedural requirements for local government regulation of
private property."
During the initial years of local government zoning and land use
control, there was considerable concern whether zoning laws were con-
stitutional. 13 Early courts held that a government's limitation of a pri-
Planning vs. Democracy, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., Jul. 1986, at 3 (discussing the
pros and cons of public participation in the land use planning process).
The law is seldom clear concerning which level of government should make impor-
tant land use decisions. One example of this is the present struggle over the control of
hazardous wastes and other environmental pollutants. Schwenke, Walls & Lockett, Lo-
cal Control of Hazardous Waste Through Land Use Regulation, 21 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 603 (1986); Comment, An Assessment of the Role of Local Government in
Environmental Regulation, 5 UCLA J. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 145 (1986).
10. For general surveys of the law of zoning and land use control, see D.
MANDELKER & R. CUNNINGHAM, PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND DEVELOP-
MENT (2d ed. 1985); P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS (1987); N. WIL-
LIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW (1974). Several issues associated with the
jurisprudence of land use law are considered in Caldwell, Land and the Law: Problems
in Legal Philosophy, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 319.
11. Government regulation of land use and development is effected through an exer-
cise of the police power. The police power includes the inherent regulatory powers of
sovereign governments. The United States Constitution divided these powers between
the Federal Government and the states. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915); Supercade Cherry Hill,
Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown, 178 N.J. Super. 152, 428 A.2d 530 (1981); Metzelbaum,
History of Zoning, 9 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 36 (1957).
12. All fifty states have zoning enabling legislation which grants authority to munic-
ipalities. Most of the zoning enabling statutes adopted prior to 1924 were based on the
New York General City Enabling Act of 1917. After 1924, states modeled zoning en-
abling acts on the Standard State Enabling Act, which was published by the United
States Department of Commerce in 1923. These state statutes delegate the zoning
power to local governments. Courts held that it is fundamental that state legislatures
delegate to municipalities police powers related to local governmental functions. E.g.,
Stucki v. Plavin, 291 A.2d 508 (Me. 1972); State ex rel. Thelen v. City of Missoula, 168
Mont. 375, 543 P.2d 173 (1975); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE
LJ. 896 (1970).
13. The early state cases which considered the constitutionality of zoning are col-
lected in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 390-93 (1926). See also Baker,
Zoning Ordinance, 11 IOWA L. REV. 152 (1926); Note, Constitutionality of Zoning, 72
U. PA. L. REV. 421 (1924); Comment, The Constitutionality of Zonin Laws, 32 YALE
L.J. 833 (1923); Comment, Municipal Zoning, 19 MICH. L. REV. 191 (1920).
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vate landowner's use of his property went beyond the police power and
was an unconstitutional deprivation of property. In 1926, however, the
United States Supreme Court, in Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,14 upheld
the zoning ordinance of Euclid, Ohio, a small Cleveland suburb. Sub-
sequent federal and state courts have affirmed the rule that local gov-
ernments may impose reasonable restrictions on private property. 15
In addition to zoning laws, most communities develop master plans
or comprehensive plans.1 6 Under such plans, communities develop an
overall scheme for the future physical use of all private and public land
within their political boundaries. 7 Planning includes the considera-
tion of the competing immediate and future needs of the community,
with a strategy for resolving conflicts and satisfying future demands.' 8
14. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
15. See generally, Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896
(1970). For a discussion of the winning arguments in Euclid, see Fluck, Euclid v. Am-
bler: A Retrospective, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A. 326 (1986); Tarlock, Euclid Revisited, LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIGEST, Jan. 1982, at 4.
16. Many jurisdictions use the terms master plan and comprehensive plan inter-
changeably to mean a local land development plan setting forth objectives, policies and
standards to guide public and private development of land within its planning jurisdic-
tion. See Mandelker & Netter, A New Role for the Comprehensive Plan, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIGEST, Sept. 1981, at 5; Mendelker, The Role of the Comprehensive Plan in
Land Use Regulation, 74 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1976); Morris, The Master Plan and Its
Derivatives in the United States, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 563 (1984). Those
states distinguishing master plans from comprehensive plans do so on the basis of the
policy concerns of the jurisdiction. See Theobold v. Board of County Comm'rs, 644
P.2d 942 (Colo. 1982); P. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS § 37.01 (1987).
17. While zoning laws generally apply only to private property, the comprehensive
planning process considers all real property, public and private, within the jurisdiction.
See A. CATANESE & T. SNYDER, INTRODUCTION TO URBAN PLANNING (1979);
Rosenberry, Master Plans and Local Land Use Regulation, 2 ZONING & PLANNING L.
REP. 113 (1979); Topping, Consolidating Plans and Regulations, LAND USE L. & ZON-
ING DIGEST, July 1982, at 4.
18. Since World War II, there has been an upsurge in demands on the available
land and natural resources, putting stress on planners and on political relationships.
Jackson, Land Use in America: The Dilemma of Changing Times, in LAND USE ISSUES
OF THE 1980's 18 (T. Carr & E. Duensing eds. 1983). Community planners must work
with competing social values and interests. This has caused a continuous search by
professional planners for an analytical framework under which they can achieve effec-
tive comprehensive planning. Hoch, Doing Good and Being Right: The Pragmatic Con-
nection in Planning, 50 J. AM. PLAN A. 335 (1984); Marcuse, Professional Ethics and
Beyond: Values in Planning, 43 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 264 (1976); Wood, Planning,
Justice and the Public Good, in PLANNING THEORY: PROSPECTS FOR THE 1980's 68 (P.
Healey, G. McDougall & M. Thomas eds. 1982). Some suggest that the task of resolv-
ing conflicting social values is beyond the capacity of even the most experienced plan-
ners. Planners, of course, disagree and point to many benefits associated with their
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In many areas, community planning is the catalyst which promotes
cooperation among conflicting interests. 19 In some states, local plan-
professional training. Compare I. BRACKEN, URBAN PLANNING METHODS: RE-
SEARCH AND POLICY ANALYSIS 12 (1981); Self, Is Comprehensive Planning Possible
and Rational?, 2 POL'Y & POL. 193, 195 (1974); Tarlock, Consistency with Adopted
Land Use Plans as a Standard of Review: The Case Against, 9 URB. L. ANN. 69, 75-76
(1975), with Kmiec, The Role of the Planner in a Deregulated World, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIGEST, June 1982, at 4; Moore, Why Allow Planners to Do What They Do? A
Justification From Economic Theory, 44 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 387 (1978); Rider,
Local Government Planning: Prerequisites of an Effective System, 18 URB. AFF. Q. 271
(1982); Schon, Some of What A Planner Knows: A Case Study of Knowing-in-Practice,
48 J. AM. PLAN. A. 351 (1982).
An author recently criticized many planners for their overly narrow perspective of
the issues involved in their planning decisions. In J. FABOS, LAND-USE PLANNING:
FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL CHALLENGE 3-7 (1985), the author urged land-use planners
to consider at least four factors as part of the planning process:
1. the number of people affected,
2. the number of localities affected,
3. the potential for cumulative effect of the action, and
4. whether a regional, national or international issue is involved.
For an article considering the relationship between planners and politicians, see Baer,
Urban Planner: Doctors or Midwives?, 37 PUB. AD. REV. 671 (1977).
19. The ability of planners to anticipate and solve problems is essential to the plan-
ning process. While anticipatory and integrated planning is the ideal, the failure to
resolve jurisdictional disputes undermines many planning efforts. The need for greater
interaction and cooperation between government organizations is necessary for effective
planning. One author sought to apprise his fellow planners of their responsibilities be-
yond the borders of their own planning area.
The cumulative effects of millions of local actions often have regional and to some
degree national and global consequences. If this is true, how can local need be met
in a responsible manner, so as to minimize the negative consequences of our ac-
tions? Local land-use planners are wise to adopt the attitude that while they act
locally they learn to think globally. The forces of decentralization, the increased
involvement of the public in land-use decision making, all suggest the importance
of local planning. But at the same time local planners have to understand that the
development of every acre of productive agriculture land decreases that resource
base nationally and internationally.... Land use planners have not yet succeeded
in responding to this broader concern, especially at the local planning level.
J. FABoS, LAND-USE PLANNING: FROM GLOBAL TO LOCAL CHALLENGE 188-89
(1985).
Of course, there are disadvantages such as delay, increased costs, and hidden agendas
associated with cross-border joint land use planning. See, Thurow & Vranicar, Proce-
dural Reform of Local Land-Use Regulation, in LAND USE ISSUE OF THE 1980'S, 190,
192-95 (T. Carr & E. Duensing eds. 1983). Notwithstanding these hurdles, there are
methods of opening up the channels of communication to resolve important land use
issues. See C. PATrON & D. SAWICKI, BASIC METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND
PLANNING (1986); T. SULLIVAN, RESOLVING DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES THROUGH
NEGOTIATIONS (1984); SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT (N.
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ning is mandatory.2" In those jurisdictions, once a community adopts
a plan, any subsequent changes in the zoning laws must be consistent
with the comprehensive plan.
B. Special Concerns of Local Governments in Land Use Regulation
The scope of local government planning and land use control in each
community depends on the elected officials' perception of the public
need within the scope of the police power. Where these public officials
legislate land use restrictions based on a reasonable exercise of the po-
lice power, state and federal courts uniformly uphold their actions.
21
A local government's regulation of land uses within its borders often
falls within one or more of the following special areas of community
concern. Local governments regulate to protect public health,22 imple-
Huelsberg and W. Lincoln eds. 1985). But see Zimmerman, Solving Local Government
Problems by Pragmatic Action, 12 CURRENT MUN. PRoBS. 39 (1985).
Another difficulty associated with efforts to solve policy disputes in the planning pro-
cess is that the key players often have incompatible academic training. Urban planners,
political scientists, sociologists, lawyers, engineers, all learn different approaches to
problem solving. This complicates the effort to reach a resolution of any issue. See, e.g.,
Alterman & MacRae, Planning and Policy Analysis: Converging or Diverging Trends, 49
J. AM. PLAN. A. 200 (1983).
20. Most state zoning enabling acts provide that zoning must be "in accordance
with a comprehensive plan." Many state courts, however, fail to give this requirement
its literal meaning. Thus, courts have held that a municipality satisfies the statute if its
land use regulation is rational, even though the local government does not have, in some
"physical form," a comprehensive plan. E.g., Sasich v. City of Omaha, 216 Neb. 864,
347 N.W.2d 93 (1984); Kozesnick v. Montgomery Township, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1
(1957). The first significant break with this interpretation came in an Oregon case,
Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). The Fasano court held
that any zoning change must be consistent with the comprehensive plan.
Several states now mandate comprehensive planning by state statute and many also
require that zoning be consistent with the plan. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(a)(ii)
(Deering Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-62 (West Supp. 1986). At least one
strong justification for mandatory comprehensive planning and a consistency require-
ment is that they ensure due process and equal protection considerations in the land use
decisionmaking process. Amcon Corp. v. City of Eagan, 348 N.W.2d 66, 74 (Minn.
1984); J. DIMENTO, THE CONSISTENCY DOCTRINE AND THE LIMITS OF PLANNING
(1980).
21. E.g., Supercade Cherry Hill, Inc. v. Borough of Eatontown, 178 N.J. Super.
152, 428 A.2d 530 (1981).
22. People v. Sojourners Motorcycle Club, 134 Ill. App.3d 448, 480 N.E.2d 840
(1985) (upholding regulation of private indoor clubs which served alcohol); State v.
Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972) (finding that regulation of mobile
homes to prevent unsanitary conditions was valid exercise of police power).
In recent years, a major public health concern of local communities has been the
storage and disposal of hazardous waste. Tonn, 500-Year Planning: A Speculative Prov-
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menting various requirements to admit adequate light and air23 and
prohibiting the construction of residential dwellings in industrial ar-
eas.24 Moreover, local governments act to promote public safety,2" for
example, by regulating the existence of open pits in residential areas,
2 6
the location of gasoline stations,27 and development in floodplains.2 8
The government may also protect public morals29 by controlling adult
entertainment. 30 Governments may also use land use control for aes-
thetic purposes3 1 to regulate outdoor advertising 32 and the location of
ocation, 52 J. AM. PLAN. A. 185 (1986) (raising issue of the long-term risks associated
with the presence of hazardous substances in our communities); Comment, Local Zon-
ing of Hazardous Waste Facilities, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP., Dec. 1984, at 86.
23. E.g., Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603 (1927); Prah v. Maretti, 108 Wis.2d 223, 321
NW.2d 182 (1982).
A current problem involving light and air is the effort of local governments to accom-
modate solar energy systems. Many communities amended their zoning ordinances to
provide for this new use. See G. HAYES, SOLAR AccESs LAW (1979); Lungren, Solar
Entitlement: A Proposed Legislative Model, 4 J. ENERGY & POL'Y 171 (1983); Osofsky,
Solar Building Envelopes: A Zoning Approach for Protecting Residential Solar Access, 15
URB. LAW. 637 (1983).
24. E.g., Grubel v. MacLaughlin, 286 F. Supp. 24 (D.V.I. 1968); Roney v. Board of
Supervisors, 138 Cal. App.2d 740, 292 P.2d 529 (1956).
25. E.g., Queenside Hills Realty Co. v. Sax], 328 U.S. 80 (1946); Lindsey v. City of
Fayetteville, 256 Ark. 352, 507 S.W.2d 101 (1974); Monaghan v. Town of North Read-
ing, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 922, 389 N.E.2d 786 (1979).
26. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 20 Cal. Rptr. 638, 370
P.2d 342, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962).
27. E.g., V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Review, 390 A.2d 378 (R.I. 1978).
28. E.g., Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of Utica, 57 App. Div. 2d 51, 394 N.Y.S.2d
913 (1977), appeal denied, 42 N.Y.2d 960, 398 N.Y.S.2d 146, 367 N.E.2d 652.
29. E.g., McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal.2d 879, 264 P.2d 932
(1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954) (finding that construction of houses on pilings
could provide opportunity for immoral conduct of youth); St. Louis Gunning Adver-
tisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911) (much quoted case
mentioning potential for immoral conduct in the vicinity of billboards).
30. See Alexander v. City of Minneapolis, 698 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1983); Lydo En-
terprises, Inc. v. City of Las Vegas, 745 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1984); Christy v. City of
Ann Arbor, 625 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Mich. 1986); Brown v. Pornography Comm'n, 620
F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Marcus, Zoning Obscenity: Or, the Moral Politics of
Porn, 27 BuFF. L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, Municipal Zoning Restrictions on Adult En-
tertainment, 58 IND. L.J. 505 (1983); Note, Regulating Pornography Through Zoning:
Can We "'Clean Up"Honolulu, 8 U. HAWAII L. REV. 75 (1986); Note, Zoning and the
Suppression of Free Speech, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 216 (1985).
31. See Members of City Council v. Taxpayers of Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
McDonald v. State, 693 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) (upholding community's right
to regulate the accumulation of weeds, rubbish and debris on private property); A.
DAWSON, LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE LAW (1982); Cortonis, Law and Aesthetics:
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junkyards.33 Communities may act to preserve property values and
neighborhood character34 by imposing minimum lot size require-
ments 35 and by protecting the historic character of certain districts.36
In addition, to ensure the availability of public services, 37 the commu-
A Critique and a Reformulation of the Dilemmas, 80 MICH. L. REV. 355 (1982); Mel-
nick, Protecting Rural Cultural Landscapes: Finding Value in the Countryside, 2 LAND-
SCAPE J. 85 (1983); Smardon & Felleman, Visual Resource Management, 9 COASTAL
ZONE MGT. J. 211 (1982); Zieghler, The Quiet Revolution in Visual Resource Manage-
ment: A Viewfrom the Coast, 9 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 17 (1986).
Not all courts are ready to accept aesthetic justification alone to support a zoning
ordinance. Many courts and commentators found aesthetic judgments too subjective to
carry the burden of showing detriment to the public interest, or to overcome constitu-
tional vagueness problems. E.g., City of Independence v. Richards, 666 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984); White Advertising Metro, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 453 A.2d 29 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1982); Williams, Subjectivity, Expression, and Privacy: Problems of Aes-
thetic Regulation, 62 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1977).
32. The business of outdoor advertising dates from the early 1880's. Under the
common law, advertising signs considered offensive or dangerous were controlled under
the law of nuisance. Prohibitory local ordinances became common in the 1890's, when
billboard advertising became so aggressive and its methods so crude that some govern-
ment regulation was considered necessary. The decision generally credited with having
the greatest influence in convincing courts to uphold billboard ordinances was St. Louis
Gunning Advertisement Co. v. City of St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911),
appeal dismissed, 231 U.S. 761 (1913). In a 124 page opinion, the Missouri Court dis-
cussed the evolution of the law and found a sufficient public purpose for the control of
billboard size, height, and location. Id. at 942. For more recent discussions of billboard
control, see Crawford, Control of Signs and Billboards, in ZONING AND PLANNING
LAW HANDBOOK 129 (1982); Mandelker & Reiman, The Billboard Ban: Aesthetics
Comes ofAge, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST, Nov. 1979, at 4. See also Supersign of
Boca Raton v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 766 F.2d 1528 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (upholding ban
on advertising displayed from watercraft for purposes of safety and aesthetics).
33. E.g., Radcliff v. City of Berwyn, 129 Ill. App. 3d 70, 472 N.E.2d 98 (1984);
State v. Jones, 53 N.C. App. 466, 281 S.E.2d 91 (1981); Note, Municipal Regulation of
Junk Yards, 12 SYRACUSE L. REv. 79 (1960).
34. E.g., Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35, 43 (1972).
35. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) (preservation of open space
and protection against urban sprawl are sufficient grounds to uphold large-lot require-
ments); Commons v. Westwood Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 81 N.J. 597, 410 A.2d 1138
(1980); Gignoux v. Village of Kings Point, 199 Misc. 485, 99 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1950);
Becker, Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning, 1969 WASH. U.L.Q. 263 (1969);
Note, Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969). In recent years, the courts have
given greater scrutiny to large lot zoning practices because of their exclusionary effect.
E.g., Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Application of Wetherhill, 45 Pa.
Commw. 303, 406 A.2d 827 (1979).
36. E.g., Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 905 (1976).
37. The leading case which defines the proper scope of municipal growth control
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nity may impose a moratorium on development in remote areas. Fi-
nally, a local government may preserve natural resources38 by
protecting farmland from urban development 39 and wetlands from
elimination.' °
C. Governmental Immunity from Municipal Zoning Ordinances
A local government's authority to regulate land use frequently con-
flicts with the efforts of superior government bodies to develop their
land within or near the local government's borders. Courts have devel-
oped an entire body of law in response to the conflict between the city's
right to control community development and the state's right to de-
velop and use land for the benefit of the entire state. Traditionally,
courts applied one of three tests to resolve the controversy: the emi-
nent domain test,4 1 the superior sovereignty test,42 and the governmen-
tal-proprietary test.4 3  These tests provide that an intruding
government which has the power of eminent domain, is higher in the
governmental hierarchy, or is exercising a governmental function en-
joys judicial immunity from zoning ordinances unless an express legis-
lative directive to the contrary exists. The general rule which emerges
from these tests is that superior government entities are immune from
zoning controls.
Within the last decade or so, several state courts became dissatisfied
with these traditional single-factor tests. A number of courts now re-
ordinances is Golden v. Ramapo Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285
N.E.2d 291, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
38. See A. DAWSON, LAND-USE PLANNING AND THE LAW 97-117 (1982); U.S.
WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAS TO REDUCE
FLOOD LOSSES (1982); Blackwelder, Creative Zoning for the Environment Emerges in
Florida, 59 FLA. B.J. 17 (1985); Kusler, Regulating Sensitive Lands: An Overview of
Programs, in LAND USE ISSUES OF THE 1980'S 128 (J. Carr & E. Duensing eds. 1983).
39. E.g., Hopewell Township Bd. of Supervisors v. Golla, 499 Pa. 246, 452 A.2d
1337 (1982).
40. Eg., Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
41. E.g., O'Connor v. City of Rockford, 3 Ill. App.3d 548, 279 N.E.2d 356 (1972);
State ex rel Askew v. Kopp, 330 S.W.2d 882 (Mo. 1960).
42. Eg., County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles, 212 Cal. App. 2d 160, 28
Cal. Rptr. 32 (1963); Mayor of Baltimore v. State, 281 Md. 217, 378 A.2d 1326 (1977).
43. E.g., Town of Oronoco v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W.2d 426
(1972); Gedney Ass'n v. State Dep't of Mental Hygiene, 112 Misc.2d 209, 446 N.Y.S.2d
876 (1982). The criteria for distinguishing a governmental from a proprietary function
were discussed in Comment, The Applicability of Zoning Ordinances to Governmental
Land Use, 39 TEX. L. REV. 316, 318 (1961).
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solve state-local government land use conflicts through a balancing
test.' The leading case upholding the balancing test is the decision in
Florida of Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citizens v. City of
Temple Terrace." After analyzing the three traditional approaches to
governmental immunity, the court adopted a test which balanced the
public interests. The Court stated:
The adoption or the balancing of interests test will compel govern-
mental agencies to make more responsible land-use decisions by
forcing them to consider the feasibility of other sites for the facil-
ity as well as alternative methods of making the use of the proper
site less detrimental to the local zoning scheme.
Our burgeoning population and the rapidly diminishing avail-
able land make it all the more important that the use of land be
intelligently controlled. This can only be done by a cooperative
effort between interested parties who approach their differences
with an open mind and with respect for the objectives of the
other.46
44. See Note, Governmental Immunity From Zoning, 22 B.C.L. REV. 783 (1981).
The Ohio Supreme Court joined several other states in adopting the balancing test in
Brownfield v. State, 63 Ohio St.2d 282, 407 N.E.2d 1365 (1980).
45. 322 So.2d 571 (Fla. App. 1975), aff'd, 332 So.2d 610 (Fla. 1976). See also City
of Ames v. Story County, 392 N.W.2d 145 (Iowa 1986).
46. 322 So.2d at 578-79. In Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Or-
dinances, 84 HARv. L. REv. 869, 883-84 (1971), the author listed some fundamental
considerations which a court might use in resolving conflicts between a local zoning
ordinance and a government agency's proposed land use:
1. Is there any statutory guidance as to which interest should prevail?
2. Do the zoning ordinance and any other manifestation of the local planning
process comprehend alternative locations for the particular facility?
3. Did the superior governmental unit consider alternative locations for the
facility?
4. What is the scope of the political authority of the governmental unit perform-
ing the function relative to the body instituting the zoning ordinance?
5. Did a government unit of "higher" authority such as a state-wide planning
commission provide independent supervisory review of the proposed facility?
6. How essential is the facility to the local community? To the broader
community?
7. How detrimental is the proposed facility to the surrounding property?
8. Did the governmental unit make reasonable attempts to minimize the detri-
ment to the adjacent landowners' use and enjoyment of their property?
9. Did the ordinance provide the adversely affected landowners an opportunity to
present their objections to the proper nonjudicial authorities?
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II. FEDERAL POWER TO PREEMPT STATE AND LOCAL
REGULATION OF FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY: ROOTS OF
THE FEDERAL BARGAINING POSTURE
In conflicts arising along the boundaries between local and federal
property, however, courts refuse to use the balancing test employed in
state-local conflicts. The general rule is that a federal agency com-
pletely preempts local regulation of federal land. A federal agency's
authority to preempt local land use regulation emanates from several
clauses in the United States Constitution. The most comprehensive
federal power in this regard is the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative
Jurisdiction, derived from article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Constitu-
tion. Courts hold that this doctrine precludes a state from regulating
activities on federal land.4" Many federal agencies including the De-
partment of Defense, however, have adopted policies that disfavor the
special status of exclusive legislative jurisdiction.4" Consequently, fed-
eral agencies often administer land unprotected by the Doctrine of Ex-
clusive Legislative Jurisdiction and must rely on other constitutional
powers to preempt local regulation. Among the protective powers
which the federal government has asserted are the judicial doctrines
associated with the Supremacy Clause49 and Property Clause.5°
47. E.g., United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363 (1973). The most
complete study of the origins, judicial interpretation, and legislative use of the "exclu-
sive legislation" clause is now thirty years old. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE
FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, PART
I: THE FACTS AND COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS (1956); INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE
STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, PART II: A
TEXT OF THE LAW OF LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION (1957). Subsequent analyses of this
constitutional provision have drawn heavily on the study by the Interdepartmental
Committee. Adjustment of Legislative Jurisdiction on Federal Enclaves, Hearings on
S.815 Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on
Government Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); Altieri, Federal Enclaves: The
Impact of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction Upon Civil Litigation, 72 MIL. L. REV. 55
(1976); Engdahl, State and Federal Power Over Federal Property, 18 ARIZ. L. REV. 283
(1976); Note, Federal Enclaves-through the Looking Glass-Darkly, 15 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 754 (1964); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION: A
REPORT PREPARED FOR THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION (1969).
48. The Department of the Army's policy is that exclusive legislative jurisdiction
should not be acquired except in extraordinary circumstances. Army Regulation, No.
405-20 (Aug. 2, 1973); Interview with Gordon Hobbs, Real Estate Assistant, Office of
the Secretary of the Army, Department of the Army (Feb. 6, 1986).
49. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 3, cl. 2.
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It is essential that a local government preparing to bargain with a
federal agency understand these federal preemptive powers. Local
community leaders should know that federal power over federal land
emanates from several different constitutional clauses that determine
the scope of federal authority. The accurate identification of the source
of federal power, along with any legislative, executive, or judicial limi-
tation, is critical in gauging the strength of the federal position.
A. Acquisition of "'Exclusive Legislation" by the United States
The United States can acquire exclusive legislative jurisdiction, or
"exclusive legislation", under article I, section 8, clause 17 of the Con-
stitution which states:
The Congress shall have power ... to exercise exclusive Legisla-
tion in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten
Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular states, and the Ac-
ceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the
United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places
purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which
the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
Initially, the courts held that the United States could acquire this
exclusive legislation only when it purchased real property with the con-
sent of a state.5 Subsequent courts, however, held that the same au-
thority could be obtained through a state cession of legislative control
to the United States or by a federal reservation of jurisdiction when it
admitted a state to the Union.5 2
An important principle of exclusive legislation is the axiom that once
the federal government has this authority a state may not unilaterally
recapture legislative control.53 Of course, Congress may conclude that
51. In 1875, a Wisconsin court in the case of In re O'Connor, 37 Wis. 379 (1875),
found that the United States failed to obtain exclusive legislative jurisdiction where the
state legislature ceded jurisdiction to the United States but the federal government did
not "purchase" the land within the meaning of clause 17. The court found the "act or
cession by the legislature is void. For it is not competent for the legislature to abdicate
its jurisdiction over its territory, except where the lands are purchased by the United
States, for the specific purposes contemplated by the Constitution." Id. at 387.
52. Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525 (1985).
53. In re Ladd, 74 F.2d 31 (C.C.D. Neb. 1896), where the State of Nebraska uncon-
ditionally ceded exclusive jurisdiction over two military installations, the state lcgisla-
ture was powerless to subsequently amend its cession law to enforce the state's
intoxicating liquor law on those two federal properties.
A similar result occurred in the case of United States v. Heard, 270 F. Supp. 198
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all or a portion of the federal exclusive legislative jurisdiction should be
retroceded to a state or to the states.54 Moreover, the United States
may lose its exclusive legislation when it transfers ownership or control
over the federal land to a non-federal owner."
B. Federal Power to Preempt State and Local Government
Regulation under the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislation
As early as 1845, the Supreme Court stated that when the federal
government obtains exclusive legislative authority "the national and
municipal powers of government of every description, are united in the
Government of the Union." 56 Traditionally, this authority absolutely
barred states and local governments from exercising police power or
other legislative authority over exclusive jurisdiction property.57 In
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Chiles,58 the Supreme Court defined,
the limits of state power over federal land cloaked with legislative
jurisdiction.
(W.D. Mo. 1967). In that case, the State of Missouri, in 1929, unconditionally ceded
jurisdiction to the United States over federal installations. Then, in 1957, the State
amended its cession statute to provide: "but the jurisdiction ceded to the United States
continues no longer than the United States owns the land and uses the same for the
purposes for which they were acquired." The State acquired the land in 1922 for the
operation of a veterans hospital, but by the time of trial in 1967 it was in use as a job
corps center. The court properly held that the 1957 amendment was unsuccessful in
recapturing the legislative jurisdiction.
54. From time to time, Congress returned all or a portion of its legislative control to
the states when it believed that the operation of federal exclusive legislative authority
caused injustice. See Act of 21 January 1871, 16 Stat. 399 (returning legislative jurisdic-
tion over a disabled soldiers' home to a state, so residents of the home could vote in a
local election).
55. In S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558 (1946), the United States acquired
legislative jurisdiction over a building which it later sold to a private party under an
installment-sales contract. Even though the fee title remained in the United States, the
Court concluded that because the government abandoned control over the property
jurisdiction terminated.
56. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845).
57. A complete cataloguing of all the restraints against state and local government
regulation over exclusive legislative jurisdiction property is beyond the scope of this
Article. A few examples include exclusion of authority to tax, Surplus Trading Co. v.
Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930); inapplicability of state fair trade acts, Sunbeam Corp. v.
Horn, 149 F. Supp. 423 (S.D. Ohio 1955); and inapplicability of local professional li-
censing laws, Lynch v. Hammock, 204 Ark. 911, 165 S.W.2d 369 (1942).
58. 214 U.S. 274 (1909) (holding that Virginia law which penalized telegraph mes-
sengers for failure to deliver messages failed to apply within the borders of the Norfolk
Navy Yard, which was under exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States).
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[The Norfolk Navy Yard] is one of the places where the Congress
possessed exclusive legislative power. It follows that the laws of
the State of Virginia... cannot be allowed any operation or effect
within the limits of the Yard. The exclusive power of legislation
necessarily includes the exclusive jurisdiction... It is of the high-
est public importance that the jurisdiction of the state should be
resisted at the borders of those places where the power of exclu-
sive legislation is vested in the Congress. 9
1. The Extraterritoriality Principle under the Doctrine of Exclusive
Legislative Jurisdiction.
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Collins v.
Yosemite Park and Curry Company illustrates this traditional notion of
complete exclusion under the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Juris-
diction.6" In Collins, the Court considered the enforceability of Cali-
fornia's liquor laws within the borders of Yosemite National Park, an
area under exclusive legislative jurisdiction. The State sought to con-
trol the sale of alcohol and beverages by park concessionaires. The
Supreme Court considered the argument that the twenty-first Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution gave California sufficient au-
thority to regulate alcohol anywhere within the state. Traditionally,
states wielded considerable power under the twenty-first Amendment.
In Collins, however, the Court found that the Doctrine of Exclusive
Legislative Jurisdiction limited the state's legislative authority. The
Court held:
The lower court was of the opinion that though the [Twenty-first]
Amendment may have increased "the state's power to deal with
the problem, it did not increase its jurisdiction." With this con-
clusion, we agree. As territorial jurisdiction over the Park was in
the United States, the State could not legislate for the area merely
on account of the Twenty-first amendment.61
Courts have applied this extraterritoriality rule to bar state and local
land use control over exclusive legislation property.62 Illustrative is the
59. Id. at 278. See also Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532 (1885).
60. 304 U.S. 518 (1938).
61. Id. at 538.
62. Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d 323, 327-29 (10th Cir. 1938). In this case,
the Tenth Circuit considered the issue whether municipal ordinances requiring con-
struction licenses, bonds, and building inspections were applicable to a federal low-cost
housing project on "exclusive legislation" property. The court found the local govern-
ment was utterly excluded from imposing its ordinances on the federal government. Id.
at 327-29.
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opinion of the United States Attorney General63 considering whether
the Virginia State Board of Harbor Commissioners could require the
Navy to submit for review its plans for the construction of a cofferdam.
The Attorney General found that the federal government possessed ex-
clusive legislative jurisdiction over the property, giving the Navy "ab-
solute and paramount" authority. Consequently, the Navy was not
obligated to cooperate with or obtain the approval of the state agency.
2. Possible Exceptions to the Extraterritoriality Principle. In most
cases holding that the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction
preempts local law, the local law conflicted with a federal activity or
policy. While the courts in such cases often refer to the federal-state
conflict, the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction fails to re-
quire proof of any interference with federal function. The language of
clause 17 lacks an express condition that the authority of the United
States is preemptive only if there is a conflict.
Thus, a corollary issue is whether the clear absence of a conflict
waives the application of the extraterritoriality principle. Apparently,
the Supreme Court adopted this position in Howard v. Commissioners
of Louisville.64 In that case, the Court upheld a municipal annexation
of exclusive legislation property where the federal government failed to
object to the annexation. The Court found no interference between the
City's annexation and the activities carried out on the federal property.
In rejecting the application of the traditional extraterritoriality rule,
the Court stated:
A state may conform its municipal structures to its own plan, so
long as the state does not interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction
within the federal area by the United States ... The fiction of a
state within a state can have no validity to prevent the state from
exercising its power over the federal area within its boundaries, so
long as there is no interference with the jurisdiction asserted by
the Federal Government.65
63. 24 Op. Att'y Gen. 50, 51 (1902). The State Board of Harbor Commissioners
sought to enjoin federal development until it approved the Navy's plans. The Attorney
General stated that when Virginia consented to the Navy's purchase of the Norfolk
Navy Yard, the State acknowledged that the federal government would determine what
was in the public's interest thereafter. Id. at 51.
64. 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
65. Id. at 626-27. See also Kansas City v. Querry, 511 S.W.2d 790 (Mo. 1974)
(upholding Kansas City's annexation of Richards-Gebaur Air Force Base).
In 1970, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Howard and applied it without dissent in
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970). The Court in Cornman held that the property
constituting the National Institutes of Health, which the court explicitly declared to be
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Since Howard many courts have sought to qualify the extraterritori-
ality doctrine, especially where no clear conflict exists. 66 In Branden-
berg Telephone Co. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co.,67 the
Kentucky Supreme Court decided whether the State could regulate the
telephone services provided to an exclusive legislation federal installa-
tion. The federal facility expressed no preference for service between
two competing telephone companies.68 Subsequently, the State acted
to place the federal facility within the service area of one of the compa-
nies. 69 The ousted firm contended that the State lacked jurisdiction
over the federal land and that the federal government should choose
between the two services.70 The Kentucky court held that, absent any
objection by the federal agency, the State was free to treat the federal
property as "that of any private property owner."71
One problem with Howard and its progeny is that the courts fail to
consider the potential for future conflict where the state or local gov-
ernment acts with respect to federal land. A recent Sixth Circuit deci-
sion involving the same issue considered by the Supreme Court in
Howard recognized this potential for interference. In United States v.
McGee,72 the court considered the Air Force's challenge to the annexa-
tion of Wright-Patterson Air Force Base by Dayton, Ohio. The Doc-
trine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction protected the base. The
"exclusive legislation" property, id. at 420, did not cease to be a part of Maryland when
the State ceded jurisdiction over the property to the United States. Consequently, the
Court held that persons who resided upon that property could not be denied the right to
vote in Maryland on the ground that they were not residents of that State. The Court's
holding overturned a long line of precedent which had relied on the extraterritoriality
rule, collected in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1954).
Notwithstanding Howard and Cornman, it is unclear whether the Court repudiated
the extraterritoriality principle. Ten years after Howard, the Supreme Court in dictum
recited approvingly the extraterritoriality rule. Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263
(1963) (Dictum). See also United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm'n, 412 U.S. 363
(1973).
66. E.g., United States v. City of Bellevue, 474 F.2d 473 (8th Cir. 1973); First Har-
din Nat'l Bank v. Fort Knox Nat'l Bank, 361 F.2d 276 (6th Cir. 1966); Bartsch v.
Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 357 F.2d 923 (4th Cir. 1966); Economic
Dev. & Indus. Corp. v. United States, 546 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mass. 1982); Board of
County Comm'rs v. Donoho, 144 Colo. 321, 356 P.2d 267 (1960).
67. 506 S.W.2d 513 (Ky. 1974).
68. Id. at 516.
69. Id. at 515.
70. Id. at 516.
71. Id.
72. 714 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1983).
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district court found that the "potential for friction" between the base
and Dayton justified overruling the annexation.7 3 The McGee court
noted:
Annexation of the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base would create
a real danger that a future board of city commissioners might pass
ordinances that interfere with the base's essential task of national
defense and create friction between city and military officials. The
fact that the present board of commissioners apparently has
agreed not to interfere with the functioning of the base is not rele-
vant to this consideration.74
Nevertheless, the Howard decision suggests that a local government
may proceed where its plans do not interfere with federal policy. The
local planning agency may even seek the cooperation and assistance of
the federal government. But, federal officials may view such joint plan-
ning and cooperation efforts as interfering with their decisionmaking
authority or as foreshadowing a future intent by the city to enforce the
objectives of the local comprehensive plan. This perception may lead
federal land managers to assert federal preemptive power under the
Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction or under one of the other
constitutional powers.
III. OTHER FEDERAL POWERS WHICH MAY PREEMPT LOCAL
REGULATION OVER FEDERAL LAND NOT PROTECTED
UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EXCLUSIVE
LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION
As previously noted, not all federal property in urban areas is pro-
tected by the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction. Concern-
ing these non-exclusive legislation lands, the United States has
successfully invoked other constitutional doctrines to limit or exclude
state and local regulation. Among the powers recognized by the courts
to limit local regulation are the doctrines emanating from the
Supremacy Clause and the Property Clause.
A. Federal Preemption under the Supremacy Clause
Article VI, clause 2 of the United States Constitution declares that
"this Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof;... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
73. Id. at 609.
74. Id. at 612-13.
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In McCulloch v. Maryland,75 Chief Justice Marshall found within this
constitutional provision the authority of the federal government to con-
duct its affairs free from state interference. The Chief Justice said:
[T]he government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is
supreme within its sphere of action. This would seem to result
necessarily from its nature. It is the government of all; its powers
are delegated by all; it represents all, and acts for all. Though any
one state may be willing to control its operations, no state is will-
ing to allow others to control them. The nation, on those subjects
on which it can act, must necessarily bind its component parts.76
In defining the reach of the Supremacy Clause, Chief Justice Mar-
shall stated that it applies to both express and implied powers. He
described these implied powers as follows:
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we
think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the
national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by
which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which
will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in
the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legiti-
mate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end,
which are not prohibited but consistent with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional. 77
This Doctrine of Federal Supremacy limits the application of state
and local laws which interfere with the federal government's ownership
and use of non-exclusive legislation real property. In Fort Leavenworth
Railroad v. Lowe,78 the Supreme Court recognized the Supremacy
Clause as an independent means by which to shield federal land from
state police power and other legislative authority. The Court stated:
Where, therefore, lands are acquired in any other way by the
United States within the limits of state than by purchase with her
consent, they will hold the lands subject to this qualification: that
if upon them.., public buildings are erected for the uses of the
general government, such buildings ... will be free from any such
interference and jurisdiction of the State as would destroy or im-
pair their effective use for the purposes designed. Such is the law
75. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
76. Id. at 405-06.
77. Id. at 421.
78. 114 U.S. 525 (1885).
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with reference to all instrumentalities created by the general gov-
ernment. Their exemption from state control is essential to the
independence and sovereign authority of the United States within
the sphere of their delegated powers.79
Before applying the Doctrine of Federal Supremacy to preempt local
regulation, however, a court may require a showing that the local law
interferes with the federal ownership and use of the land. In Stewart v.
United States Postal Service,8" a federal district court in California con-
sidered whether the federal Postal Service was obligated to comply
with the City of Saratoga's zoning laws. The property in question was
not shielded by the Doctrine of Exclusive Legislative Jurisdiction.
Although the Postal Service modified its construction plans to comply
with many of the City's requirements, it fell short of the full compli-
ance expected of a non-federal entity. The court found "that the
Supremacy Clause obviates the need for compliance where the ordi-
nances conflict with federal laws. Since the functions of the Postal Ser-
vice are hampered by compliance with such local zoning requirements,
the Postal Service need not comply with Saratoga's local
ordinances."81
A similar result occurred in Town of Middletown v. United States
Postal Service,82 where the town required the federal Postal Service to
acquire land development permits and other approvals prior to clearing
non-exclusive legislation land for a post office. As in Stewart, the court
in Town of Middletown found that the Supremacy Clause preempted
local zoning control. The court stated:
[u]nless Congress clearly and affirmatively declares that federal in-
strumentalities shall be subject to state regulation, the federal
function must be left free from such regulation. In the case at bar,
the Township of Middletown has not brought to this court's atten-
tion any evidence of congressional intent to subject federal instru-
mentalities such as the Postal Service to local zoning
regulations.83
79. Id. at 539. See also Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899).
The Supreme Court in Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167 (1976), followed the holding
in Fort Leavenworth Railroad. In Hancock, the Court found that without a clear and
unambiguous congressional waiver, a state could not seek an injunction against a federal
activity conducted on federal property, where the federal agency failed to obtain a state
air quality permit.
80 508 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
81, Id. at 116.
82. 601 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1985).
83. Id. at 127.
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In contrast to these post office cases is the decision of the Alaska
Supreme Court in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Local Boundary Commission.14
That court considered whether the 23 million acre Naval Petroleum
Reserve No. 4 was within the political boundary of Alaska's North
Slope Borough for the purposes of zoning and land use planning. The
court noted that the federal government lacked exclusive legislative ju-
risdiction over the property. Upholding a lower court decision to allow
the land to be included within the Borough's jurisdiction, the Alaska
Supreme Court stated, "the superior court properly concluded that the
record evidence of the Reserve's importance to the substantive lifestyle
of area residents showed inclusion of the tract to be desirable for inte-
grated local government so that it might fall within the new borough's
planning and zoning power." 85 In Mobil Oil, as distinguished from the
postal service cases, there was no showing of a present conflict with a
federal activity. Moreover, the court found that the inclusion of the
land within the Borough furthered an important governmental pur-
pose: integrated planning.
B. Federal Preemption under the Property Clause
Article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution pro-
vides that "the Congress shall have power to dispose of and make all
needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property
belonging to the United States." The Supreme Court interpreted this
clause in Kleppe v. New Mexico,86 which involved actions by the State
of New Mexico to remove wild burros from non-exclusive legislation
land administered by the Department of the Interior. Congress gave
the Secretary of the Interior authority, under the Wild Free-Roaming
Horses and Burros Act,87 to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed
horses and burros on public lands of the United States." The Supreme
Court found that the New Mexico Livestock Board's entry onto public
lands and its removal of wild burros interfered with the duties of the
Secretary of the Interior under the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and
Burros Act. A unanimous Court found that the Property Clause pre-
84. 518 P.2d 92 (Alaska 1974).
85. Id. at 99.
86. 426 U.S. 529 (1976). See also United States v. Moore, 640 F. Supp. 164
(S.D.W.Va. 1986) (conflict over a state's authority to spray pesticide on Department of
Interior lands).
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1985).
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empted the State from controlling wild horses and burros on public
land. The Court held:
While Congress can acquire exclusive or partial jurisdiction over
lands within a state by the state's consent or cession, the presence
or absence of such jurisdiction has nothing to do with Congress'
powers under the Property Clause. Absent consent to cession a
state undoubtedly retains jurisdiction over federal lands within its
territory, but Congress equally surely retains the power to enact
legislation respecting those lands pursuant to the Property Clause.
And when Congress so acts, the federal legislation necessarily
overrides conflicting state laws.88
Under the Supreme Court's holding in Kleppe, it is clear that Con-
gress can preempt local land use controls over all federally-owned
lands. Although Kleppe involved land administered by the Depart-
ment of the Interior, courts have applied the Property Clause power to
lands controlled by the Postal Service,89 the Department of Energy,9 °
and the Department of Defense. 9'
IV. FEDERAL STATUTES RESTRICTING THE EXERCISE OF THE
FEDERAL PREEMPTIVE POWER
Twenty years ago, the largely unchallenged preemptive power of the
United State ensured the dominance of the federal government.
Within the last two decades, however, Congress passed several statutes
that eroded some of the previously invincible federal authority. The
88. 426 U.S. at 539, 542-43. For a discussion of the case law which describes the
limits of local regulation of federal activities on federal land, see Don't Tear it Down,
Inc. v. Pennsylvania Ave. Corp., 642 F.2d 527, 533-36 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While federal
agencies may have broad discretion to regulate uses of public lands, Organized Fisher-
men of Florida v. Hodel, 775 F.2d 1544, 1550 (11th Cir. 1985), not all federal concerns
will preempt local land use control, Guschke v. City of Oklahoma City, 763 F.2d 379
(10th Cir. 1985) (holding that federal licensing of amateur radio operators did not pre-
empt local zoning restrictions on the height of radio antennas in residential areas).
89. United States v. Gliatta, 580 F.2d 156 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1048
(1978).
90. United States v. Seward, 687 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1147 (1983).
91. Economic Dev. & Indus. Corp. v. United States, 546 F. Supp. 1204 (D. Mass.
1982).
The Kleppe decision in 1976 reawakened the academic community's interest in the
Property Clause. For the most recent addition to an assemblage of law review articles
on the subject, see Gaetke, Refuting the "Classic" Property Clause Theory, 63 N.C.L.
REV. 617 (1985).
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use of these new laws by local governments can have a significant im-
pact on the intergovernmental bargaining process.
The applicable federal statutes establish both substantive and proce-
dural requirements on federal land use, including obligations to be
compatible with local environmental or land use standards. This sec-
tion will examine the courts' interpretation of several of these federal
laws. A more detailed consideration of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)9 2 and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act93
follows in subsequent sections.
A. Federal Laws Which Limit Federal Government Control of
Activities on Federal Lands
Where federal property is under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction
of the United States or otherwise protected by the Constitution, state
and local land use laws generally do not apply. In some cases, how-
ever, Congress has enacted federal land use control, natural resource
protection and pollution control statutes which apply to federal activi-
ties and may be enforceable through citizen suit provisions by local
governments. Examination of such statutes illustrates the limitations
on the exercise of the federal preemptive power.94 These statutes in-
clude: the Clean Air Act,95 the Federal Water Pollution Control
92. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1977); see supra notes 110-147 and accompanying text.
93. 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (1983); see supra notes 148-201 and accompanying text.
94. For a discussion of four federal environmental laws which restrict federal pre-
emptive power, see Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Fed-
eral Environmental Law, 14 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,326 (1985). See also
McSlarrow, The Department of Defense Environmental Cleanup Program: Application
of State Standards to Federal Facilities after SARA, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L.
INST.) 10120 (1987); Stever, Perspectives on the Problem of Federal Facility Liability for
Environmental Contamination, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,114 (1987);
Note, How Well Can States Enforce Their Environmental Laws When the Polluter is the
United States Government, 17 RUTGERS L.J. 123 (1986). Other federal laws include the
Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667e (1985); the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1985); the Forest and Rangeland and Renewable
Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1985); the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (1985); the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1700-1784 (1986); Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
339, § 1428(h), 71 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 6041, 6058 (1986). See also Exec. Order No.
11,988, 42 Fed. Reg. 26,951 (1977) (floodplains); Exec. Order No. 11,990, 42 Fed. Reg.
26,961 (1977) (wetlands).
95. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a), provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any prop-
erty or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the
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Act,"6 the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,97 the Noise Con-
trol Act,98 the National Historic Preservation Act,9 9 the Coastal Zone
discharge of air pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof, shall be
subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the control and
abatement of air pollution in the same manner, and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.
See 58 Op. Comp. Gen. 244 (1979) (holding the Air Force liable for payment of permit
fee to municipal air pollution control authority).
96. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a), provides:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and ju-
dicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any prop-
erty or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the
discharge or runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof in the
performance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal,
State, interstate, and local requirements, administrative authority, and process and
sanctions respecting the control and abatement of water pollution in the same man-
ner, and to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity including the payment
of reasonable service charges.
See Kelley v. United States, 618 F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
97. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6961, states:
Each department, agency, instrumentality of the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the Federal Government (I) having jurisdiction over any solid waste
management facility or disposal site, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or
which may result, in the disposal or management of solid waste or hazardous waste
shall be subject to, and comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local re-
quirements, both substantive and procedural (including any requirement for per-
mits or reporting or any provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may
be imposed by a court to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of
solid waste or hazardous waste disposal in the same manner, and to the same ex-
tent, as any person is subject to such requirements, including the payment of rea-
sonable service changes.
See California v. Walters, 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984); Meyer v. United States Coast
Guard, 644 F. Supp. 221 (E.D.N.C. 1986).
98. The Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4903(b), provides:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive, legislative, and judi-
cial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction over any property
or facility, or (2) engaged in any activity resulting, or which may result in the
emission of noise, shall comply with Federal, State, interstate, and local require-
ments respecting control and abatement of environmental noise to the same extent
that any person is subject to such requirements.
99. The National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 470f, 470h-2(f), states
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a pro-
posed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of any
Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any under-
taking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on the
undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take into
account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure or
object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
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Management Act,"° and the Farmland Protection Policy Act. t10
These and other similar federal statutes illustrate Congress' willing-
ness in specific areas of state and local concern to require federal com-
pliance with state or local laws, or consultation with state or local
agencies. The development of these inroads into federal authority,
however, has been gradual and remains limited in scope. In enforcing
these statutes, the courts are generally reluctant to divest the Federal
Government of its authority, unless the congressional intent is clear
and unambiguous. An example of the development and judicial inter-
pretation of such waivers of federal preemptive power is found in the
history of the Clean Air Act.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Congressional Waivers of Federal
Preemptive Powers
When Congress passed the 1955 forerunner of the Clean Air Act, it
lacked provisions regarding federal compliance.102 In 1959, Congress
amended the Clean Air Act to ensure that federal facilities cooperate
Prior to the approval of any Federal undertaking which may directly and adversely
affect a National Historic Landmark, the head of the responsible Federal agency
shall, to the maximum extent possible, undertake such planning and actions as may
be necessary to minimize harm to such landmarks.
See Bell, Protecting the Built Environment: An Overview of Federal Historic Preservation
Law, 15 ENvTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,354 (1985).
100. The Coastal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1), states:
Each Federal agency conducting or supporting activities affecting the coastal zone
shall conduct or support those activities in a manner which is, to the maximum
extent practicable, consistent with approved state management programs.
See Kuersteiner & Sullivan, Coastal Federalism: The Role of the Federal Supremacy
Doctrine in Federal and State Conflict Resolution, 33 JAG J. (1984).
101. The Farmland Protection Policy Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4202, provides:
(a) The Department of Agriculture, in cooperation with other departments, agen-
cies, independent commissions, and other units of the Federal Government, shall
develop criteria for identifying the effects of Federal programs on the conversion of
farmland to nonagricultural uses.
(b) Departments, agencies, independent commissions, and other units of the Fed-
eral Government shall use the criteria established under subsection (a) of this sec-
tion, to identify and take into account the adverse effects of Federal programs on
the preservation of farmland; consider alternative actions, as appropriate that
could lessen such adverse effects; and assure that such Federal programs, to the
extent practicable, are compatible with State, unit of local government, and private
program and policies to protect farmland.
See Department of Agriculture Implementing Rule, 7 C.F.R. § 658 (1986); Schnidman,
The Evolving Federal Role in Agricultural Land Preservation, 18 URB. LAw. 423 (1986).
102. Pub. L. No. 984-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
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with air pollution control agencies "to the extent practicable and con-
sistent with the interests of the United States and within any available
appropriations."'' 1 3 The 1963 amendments to the Act retained this
language, but required federal facilities to obtain permits from the Sec-
retary of Health, Education, and Welfare in those cases where air pol-
lution might endanger human health or welfare. 104 In 1970, Congress
completely revised the Clean Air Act to require that federal facilities
comply with all "[f]ederal, state, interstate, and local requirements re-
specting control and abatement of air pollution to the same extent that
any person is subject to such requirements."
The Supreme Court construed this 1970 revision in Hancock v.
Train.' 5 In Hancock, the Attorney General of Kentucky sued several
federal agencies to enforce federal compliance with the state air pollu-
tion permit program. The Supreme Court found that while the Clean
Air Act required federal agencies to comply with state and local air
pollution standards, the law did not mandate federal compliance with
state permit statutes.
Because of the fundamental importance of. . .shielding federal
installations and activities from regulation by the states, an au-
thorization of state regulation is found only when ... there is "a
clear congressional mandate" [and] "specific congressional ac-
tion" that makes this authorization of state regulation "clear and
unambiguous." 10 6
The Hancock Court held that the citizen suit provision of the Clean
Air Act provided the only remedy for states or local governments seek-
ing to control federal facilities or enforce state requirements. Permit
requirements, which are outside the scope of the citizen suit section,
could not be used to impair federal functions.
A year after the Court's decision in Hancock, Congress amended the
Clean Air Act to make it clear that federal facilities must comply with
state record keeping, reporting and permit requirements. 107 Notwith-
standing this congressional action, the courts have continued in the
spirit of Hancock to narrowly construe congressional waivers of federal
power under other federal laws. Consequently, recent cases have held
103. Pub. L. No. 86-365, 73 Stat. 646 (1959).
104. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392, 399 (1963).
105. 426 U.S. 167 (1976).
106. Id. at 179.
107. Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 116, 91 Stat. 685, 711 (1977) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7418
(1983)).
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that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not require
federal agencies to pay damages under state law for the cost of cleaning
up hazardous waste spills,1°8 nor does it subject the United States to
criminal prosecution for violation of state law. 10 9
While such court interpretations still shield federal facilities from
many state and local laws, the ability of local governments to attract
the attention of a federal agency is far greater than it was two decades
ago. At the very least, a local government may more easily obtain an
explanation from a federal agency for an action that violates the ex-
press policy of Congress favoring compatibility with certain state and
local laws. These explanations can thereafter be challenged through
the political process.
V. FEDERAL AGENCY AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT COOPERATION
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT:
OPPORTUNITY FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO
OBTAIN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
LAND USE INFORMATION AND TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
DECISIONMAKING PROCESS
Among the most important federal statutes which give local govern-
ments an opportunity to influence federal land use decisions is the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).11° Passed by Congress in
1969, NEPA established a procedure for environmental planning
which has significantly changed federal agency decisionmaking.
The heart of NEPA is the environmental impact statement, which
the statute requires for all proposals for a major federal action signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment."' The NEPA
impact statement must discuss the environmental effects' 12 of any fed-
eral action covered by the statute and set forth any alternatives to the
108. Florida Dep't of Envtl. Regulation v. Silvex Corp., 606 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.
Fla. 1985).
109. California v. Waiters, 751 F.2d 977 (9th Cir. 1984).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1977). For an overview of the history and judicial
interpretation of NEPA, see Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis of the Histori-
cal Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1984). See also Comment, NEPA Violations and Equita-
ble Discretion, 64 OR. L. REV. 497 (1986) (discussing use of injunctions against federal
agencies for non-compliance with NEPA).
111. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1977).
112. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1985).
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proposed action.1"3 Once it determines that the situation requires an
environmental impact statement, the federal agency must identify and
evaluate environmental impacts wherever they may occur. Thus, a
proposal of an action on federal property could lead to the federal
agency's consideration of that proposal's effects beyond the boundary
of the federal land." 14
To further implement the Act, Title II of NEPA created the Council
on Environmental Quality (CEQ) in the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent. As a result of authority granted by an executive order, CEQ
adopted regulations which implement NEPA. "5 In addition to requir-
ing compliance with the CEQ regulations, the Act requires all federal
agencies to conform their regulations and practices with NEPA.1 6
In many ways, the NEPA review process is similar to the planning
carried out by urban communities prior to significant changes in land
use." 7 The scope of NEPA, however, is far narrower than the plan-
ning functions carried out by many local governments. Unlike local
government planning, which involves continuous and comprehensive
review and analysis, the preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment by a federal agency occurs infrequently and resolves only a nar-
rowly-defined need.
Notwithstanding these differences, NEPA does provide local govern-
ment officials with opportunities to discover federal agency actions and
to provide comments concerning the impacts of the projects." 8 This
Article will highlight only those aspects of NEPA that affect the duty
113. The "'alternatives" requirement is the heart of the environmental impact state-
ment. Under this requirement federal agencies must consider whether they can carry
out their proposed action in a less environmentally damaging manner and whether al-
ternatives exist that make the action unnecessary. The "alternative" requirement is a
troublesome issue for federal agencies and courts. For a more detailed consideration of
this issue, see Chamousis, The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: What "Alter-
natives" Must an Agency Discuss? 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 221 (1976).
114. See, e.g., Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972), dis-
cussed infra at notes 131-135 and accompanying text.
115. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1985).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1977).
117. CEQ regulations list the matters that an impact statement should address. The
federal agency must identify all direct and indirect effects of the proposed federal action.
"Effects includes ecological . . . aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or
health." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1985).
118. While NEPA has been an important tool of specific interest groups seeking to
influence federal agency decisions, some groups advocate increased use of such substan-
tive laws as the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act to chal-
lenge federal actions. Trubeck & Gillen, Environmental Defense 11. Examining the
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of federal officials to cooperate with local governments. A local gov-
ernment's skillful use of NEPA may be an important tool in bringing a
reluctant federal agency to the bargaining table.
A. The Threshold Determination under NEPA
NEPA provides that federal agencies must prepare environmental
impact statements on "proposals for... major federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 1 9 This statu-
tory language determines whether an impact statement is required.
The question of whether a federal agency must prepare an impact state-
ment at a particular time is known as the "threshold" determination
under NEPA. 120
As a general matter, a federal agency must first determine whether
its activity is a proposal 121 of an action. 122 If the activity is only in the
conceptual stage, NEPA may not require an environmental impact
statement. After the agency decides it has a specific proposal of an
action, the agency must then determine if the effects on the human
environment 12' are significant.
124
An important threshold issue here is the extent to which land use
plans and zoning ordinances, containing the community's definition of
a quality environment, conflict with federal proposals. The court in
Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission v. United
States Postal Service, 25 considered the effect of local government pol-
icy on a federal facility. Maryland-National involved a Postal Service
plan to build a bulk mail center in a Washington, D.C., suburb. The
Limits of Interest Group Advocacy in Complex Disputes, in PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 195 (B. Weisbrod ed. 1978).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1977).
120. For a discussion of the threshold duty to prepare an impact statement, see
McGarity, The Courts, the Agencies, and NEPA Threshold Issues, 55 TEX. L. REv. 801
(1977). For a critical analysis of the threshold issue problem, see Baum, Canary, Reeve
& Scott, Negative NEPA: The Decision Not to File, 6 ENVTL. L. 309 (1976); Comment,
Environmental Law: Progress Toward A Coherent Standard for the "Threshold Determi-
nation," 54 WASH. L. REV. 159 (1978).
121. See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976).
122. See, e.g., Laine v. Weinberger, 541 F. Supp. 599 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
123. See, e.g., City of Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 962 (2d
Cir. 1976).
124. See, e.g., River Road Alliance v. Corps. of Engineers, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.
1985).
125. 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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Postal Service submitted its construction plans for local review and
comment in accordance with a federal consultation statute. 12 6 After
receipt of the local government's comments, the Postal Service pro-
ceeded with construction, failing to comply with several important
community concerns.
127
During the planning, the Postal Service prepared a preliminary envi-
ronmental assessment and concluded that there was no need for an
environmental impact statement. After the local government agency
found that the Postal Service refused to implement the community-
recommended changes, it brought an action to enjoin the completion of
the bulk mail facility until an environmental impact statement was pre-
pared. The local government claimed that the Postal Service plans vio-
lated the community's environmental quality standards and thus
significantly affected the quality of the human environment. 128
In resolving the claim of the local government, the court in Mary-
land-National found that the Postal Service must achieve the policy
goals of NEPA in cooperation with state and local governments. 129
Concerning the threshold issue under NEPA, the court concluded:
[When] the Federal Government exercises its sovereignty so as to
override local zoning protections, NEPA requires more careful
scrutiny.... [NEPA's] policies cannot be taken as effectuated by
local land use control, where the proposal of the Federal Govern-
ment reflects a distinctive difference in kind from the types of land
use, proposed by private and local government sponsors, that can
126. The Postal Service referred its project plans to the National Capital Planning
Commission for comments pursuant to 40 U.S.C. § 71d, which provides for "compre-
hensive planning and orderly development of the National Capital." The Commission
consulted with "the appropriate planning agency having jurisdiction over the affected
part of the environs," which was the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning
Commission. That commission adopted a resolution disapproving the Postal Service
preliminary master plan for the bulk mail facility. The Maryland-National Commission
found that the proposed project had certain undesirable effects, including inadequate
provision for the control of storm-water and oil run-off, increased traffic in the area, and
"visual and aesthetic detriment" caused by the facility's location in a greenbelt. The
Commission found that these problems violated the county zoning ordinance which
designated the area for "high quality industries on campus-like settings." 487 F.2d at
1032-33.
127. The Postal Service refused to relocate the building on the property in order to
limit the intrusion into the greenbelt. While the Postal Service proposed an impound-
ment system to control storm-water run-off, they concluded that the effective control of
oil run-off was impossible. Id. at 1034.
128. Id. at 1035-37.
129. Id. at 1036.
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fairly be taken as within the scope of local controls. 130
Thus, unless the federal action is in harmony with local land use, it is
likely that the action will frustrate the goals of NEPA.
The court in Groton v. Laird 131 considered this conflict between a
planned federal project and local policy. Groton involved a plan to
build a 300-unit military family housing complex in the Town of Gro-
ton, Connecticut. The Navy had experienced a shortage of affordable
housing for its families in the affluent community of Groton. After
consultation with local planning officials, the Navy selected property
approved in the community ordinance for multi-family dwellings. Af-
ter residents living near the site became aware of the Navy's plans, they
complained that the project would change the character of the neigh-
borhood. As a result of this community concern, local officials op-
posed the project. Failing to obtain certain concessions, the local
officials sued the Navy for failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement. To prove "significant impact", the Town of Groton claimed
that the Navy exceeded the density limitations and minimum set-back
requirements under the local ordinance.
After reviewing the Town's claim, however, the court in Groton
found that the Navy's project was compatible with the local land use
plan since "the navy project involves essentially the same use of Bailey
Hill as that envisaged by the Town." '132 Moreover, the court found
that NEPA failed to protect Groton's density restrictions as an envi-
ronmental concern. The Groton court stated:
[NEPA] is not designed to enshrine existing zoning regulations on
the theory that their violation presents a threat to environmental
130. Id. at 1036-37. The court also considered whether a federal agency project's
full compliance with local land use plans created a presumption of no significant impact.
While the court refused to find a presumption, it agreed that conformity with the local
policies would be an important factor in determining "significance." Id.
In deciding' whether the bulk mail facility had the required "significant impact," the
court found the potential for harm created by oil run-off of greater impact than the
visual effect of the facility. Id. at 1038-41. In order to determine significance in NEPA
cases, the court adopted a four-part test. The court stated:
First, did the agency take a "hard look" at the problem, as opposed to bald conclu-
sions, unaided by preliminary investigation? ... Second, did the agency identify
the relevant areas of environmental control?... Third, as to problems studied and
identified, does the agency make a convincing case that the impact is insignificant?
... If there is impact of true "significance" has the agency convincingly estab-
lished that changes in the project have sufficiently minimized it?
Id. at 1040.
131. 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972).
132. Id. at 350.
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values. NEPA may not be used by communities to shore up large
lot and other exclusionary zoning devices that price out low and
even middle income families.'
33
In this author's opinion the court held for the Navy in Groton because
of the exclusionary purpose of the Town's zoning ordinance.
In addition, the Navy did make a considerable effort to consult with
local officials and to accommodate many of the community's demands.
Early in the planning process the parties held regular meetings.1 34 As
a result of the consultation with the community leaders, the Navy
agreed to several changes in its project, including paying for the con-
struction of a new water delivery system, providing additional recrea-
tional areas within the project, redesigning of rear yards, modifying the
storm drainage system and reducing the total acres used for the
project. 131
B. Local Government Standing to Sue Under NEPA
When a local government sues a federal agency under NEPA, a
court will grant standing on the basis of claims of harm to the munici-
pal environment.' 36 In the leading case of City of Davis v. Coleman 137
the local government challenged the failure of the Department of
Transportation to prepare an environmental impact statement on a
highway interchange located near, but outside, the City. The purpose
of the interchange was to provide highway access which would stimu-
late industrial development. State law imposed a duty on the City to
develop and enforce environmental standards. The court in Coleman
133. Id.
134. Id. at 347.
135. Id. at 350. In both Groton and Maryland-National the federal property at issue
was within the political boundary of the complaining local governments. In the case of
some federal installations, the federal property may be outside the borders of the neigh-
boring city or town. In those cases, the local governments may be unable to rely on
local zoning ordinances in fashioning a NEPA case. This and other factors led some
communities to seek the annexation of federal property. See United States v. McGee,
714 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1983).
136. Town of Groton v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 344 (D. Conn. 1972). For a general
discussion of the law of standing, see Animal Lovers Volunteer Ass'n v. Weinberger, 15
ENVTL. L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 20,697 (9th Cir. 1985); Kelley v. United States, 618
F. Supp. 1103 (W.D. Mich. 1985); Beers, Standing and Related Procedural Hurdles in
Environmental Litigation, 1 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIGATION 65 (1986); Note, "More Than
an Intuition, Less Than a Theory" Toward a Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 564 (1986).
137. 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1975).
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found that the City of Davis had standing because of its state statutory
responsibility and because of the effect of the proposed federal project
on the community's water supply and controlled growth plan.
Cases following Coleman have held that local governments have
standing when the proposed federal action conflicts with the local com-
prehensive plan138 or imposes an economic lOSS.
139
C. The Opportunities for Local Governments to Participate in
Federal Agency NEPA Decisionmaking
In the City of Davis v. Coleman, the court noted that the federal
government's failure to prepare an impact statement would deprive
Davis of the "opportunity to participate in the administrative decision
making process."'" State law required the City to develop and adopt
a comprehensive land use plan. The court held that if the federal gov-
ernment denied the City of Davis the right to comment on the pro-
posed federal action, it could impair the community's planning
responsibilities and objectives.
Concerning the local government's opportunity to comment on a
major federal action, the court noted that NEPA requires "the com-
ments and views of the ... local agencies" to accompany the federal
proposal through the agency review process.' 41 The general policy of
NEPA to broaden the scope of relevant data in federal decisionmaking
buttresses NEPA's participation requirement. NEPA states:
All agencies of the Federal government shall.., utilize a system-
atic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated
use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental deci-
138. City of Rochester v. United States Postal Service, 541 F.2d 967 (2d Cir. 1976);
American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923 (C.D. Cal. 1981), aff'd, 714
F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983).
139. Town of Orangetown v. Gorsuch, 544 F. Supp. 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), aff'd,
718 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984); Conservation Council of
N.C. v. Foehlke, 435 F. Supp. 775 (M.D.N.C. 1977).
140. 521 F.2d at 670-72.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1977). The opportunity for comments from outside
the federal agency is an important part of the NEPA "full disclosure" process. CEQ
regulations interpreted the commenting requirement by providing for comment periods.
40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(3), (4) (1985). Those submitting comments are encouraged to
make their comments as specific as possible. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.3(a) (1985). Although
the statute and regulations do not require comments on a federal agency's decision not
to prepare an impact statement, the courts have found that agencies may request com-
ments in these cases. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills v. Costle, 503 F. Supp. 314
(D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 776 (3d Cir. 1980).
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sion arts in planning and in decision-making which may have an
impact on man's environment; ... [The agencies must] insure that
presently unquantified environmental amenities and values ... be
given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with
economic and technical considerations. 142
This statutory language imposes a duty on federal agencies to con-
sult with experts and government agencies having information relevant
to the agency's action. 143  In McDowell v. Schelsinger14  the court
found that the federal government violated the "systematic, interdisci-
plinary approach" requirement of NEPA by failing to consult with the
local government on the closure of a military installation. The Air
Force in McDowell had a "close-hold" decisionmaking procedure. As
a consequence, the United States did not solicit the comments of the
local government and was unaware of important environmental conse-
quences which would result from the federal action. The court found
that this kind of secrecy in agency decisionmaking "runs counter to the
thrust of NEPA... [which] contemplates that decisions with environ-
mental effects be made in cooperation with state and local governments
and concerned public and private organizations. "145
142. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A)-(B) (1977). It is unclear whether these two
paragraphs, preceding the paragraph requiring an impact statement, impose a duty on
the federal agencies separate from the responsibility to file an impact statement. See
Natural Resources Defense Council v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
143. See McDowell v. Schlesinger, 404 F. Supp. 221 (W.D. Mo. 1975); Simmans v.
Grant, 370 F. Supp. 5, 18-20 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
144, 404 F. Supp. 221.
145. Id. at 252 n.43. See also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 544 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1976);
Chelsea Neighborhood Ass'n v. United States Postal Service, 389 F. Supp. 1171
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 516 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1975).
Within the last decade, many states have adopted environmental review procedures
similar to NEPA. CEQ was concerned that a federal agency's preparation of an impact
statement could be duplicative of state-level environmental reviews. The CEQ regula-
tions now authorize federal agencies to cooperate with state and local agencies to reduce
duplication between NEPA, and state and local requirements. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.2(a)
(1985). This cooperation should cover joint research and studies, planning activities,
and public hearings so that one document will satisfy both federal and state laws. Id.
Another opportunity for a local government to participate in the NEPA environmen-
tal review process is provided under CEQ's "cooperating agency" regulation. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1501.6 (1985). The express purpose of this rule is to "emphasize agency cooperation
early in the NEPA process." State and local agencies having environmental review
responsibilities may seek designation as a "cooperating agency". 40 C.F.R. § 1508.5
(1985). As a cooperating agency, a local government agency could participate with the
"lead" federal agency in defining the scope of the environmental assessment and may
assist in the drafting of the impact statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (1985).
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In addition to the federal agency's responsibility to consult with lo-
cal governments in environmental decisionmaking, the Council of En-
vironmental Quality requires the impact statement discuss "possible
conflicts between the proposed action and the objectives of Federal,
Regional, State, and local.., land use plans, policies and controls for
the area concern.146 In order to adequately satisfy this requirement,
federal agencies must consult with local governments concerning com-
munity comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances.
VI. THE DUTY TO COOPERATE AS FOUND IN THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION ACT OF 1968 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,372
Another federal law which opens up the Federal Government's deci-
sionmaking process is the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of
1968.117 The passage of that Act and NEPA indicates Congress' intent
to require greater disclosure of information by federal officials. In
many respects, the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act provides even
greater leverage over federal agencies than does NEPA. But, local gov-
ernments should distinguish the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act
from Executive Order 12,372 signed by President Reagan on July 12,
1982. 148 Although that Order, which addresses intergovernmental re-
lations, contains many features useful to local governments, it is less
comprehensive than the Act. A local government's strongest position
would be to advocate the full implementation of the Act.
A. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968
With the rapid proliferation of federal grants in the 1960's and early
1970's, local governments found that they had limited power to con-
trol, or even to learn about federal projects that might affect the com-
146. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(c) (1985). An earlier version of the CEQ Regulations
required federal agencies to discuss any conflict or inconsistency. "Where a conflict or
inconsistency exists, the statement should describe the extent to which the agency has
reconciled its proposed action with the plan, policy or control, and the reasons why the
agency has decided to proceed notwithstanding the absence of full reconciliation." 40
C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(2), reprinted in 38 Fed. Reg. 20,550, 20,553 (1973).
A recent decision determined that a federal agency is within its authority to give a
local government the opportunity to select among the alternatives available after the
environmental review process. Britt v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 769 F.2d
84 (2d Cir. 1985).
147. 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (1983).
148. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
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munity.149 Since different agencies developed federal assistance
programs and direct federal projects in a piecemeal manner they were
often duplicative or conflicting. For example, a state highway depart-
ment could receive federal money to build an urban freeway through
land that another state or federal agency expected to use for a different
purpose.
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations was the
first to significantly analyze the problem.15 The Commission reviewed
forty-three federal programs that had a direct impact on local govern-
ment organization and planning. Among the important recommenda-
tions to come out of the study were the following:
I. The Congress and appropriate executive agencies should re-
quire federal decision-makers to consider local comprehensive
planning in their development of urban projects. 1S
2. The Congress and executive branch of the federal government
should implement coordinating procedures to promote a uni-
fied urban development policy. 152
149. See generally, Mogulof, Metropolitan Councils of Government and the Federal
Government, 7 URB. AFF. Q. 492 (1972). Between 1955 and 1975, federal assistance to
local, regional, and state agencies or organizations increased from $3 billion to $52 bil-
lion. Walker, A New Intergovernmental System in 1977, PUBLIUS, Winter 1978, at 104.
In many cases, the recipients of these intergovernmental grants were not general-pur-
pose governments but new, single-purpose, specialized agencies beyond the control of
more traditional state and local elected officials and planners. According to one esti-
mate, over 1800 special purpose local agencies appeared between the mid-1960's and
late 1970's. Id.
150. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPACT OF
FEDERAL URBAN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT ORGANIZA-
TION AND PLANNING (1964) [hereinafter 1964 ACIR Report]. See also, Metropolitan
Planning: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5250 (1963); Role of the Federal
Government in Metropolitan Areas: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.
19,906 (1962). For a historical survey of federal-urban government relations, see J.
SUNDQUIsT & D. DAVIS, MAKING FEDERALISM WORK: A STUDY OF PROGRAM CO-
ORDINATION AT THE COMMUNITY LEVEL (1969); C. VAN HORN, POLICY IMPLEMEN-
TATION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM: NATIONAL GOALS AND LOCAL IMPLEMENTATION
(1979).
151. 1964 ACIR Report, supra note 150, at 34-37. The Commission found that the
success of a federal program depended, in part on how effectively it interrelated with
other local activities and services. The more reasonable approach to achieve this inter-
locking relationship was through the early coordination between federal, state and local
planners. Id.
152. Id. at 37-39. The 1964 ACIR Report stopped short of recommending that all
federal projects be consistent with local comprehensive planning as a condition to fed-
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Four years after this study, Congress declared a national policy of
intergovernmental coordination, cooperation, and decentralized deci-
sionmaking in the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968.153
That Act's purpose was to promote "sound and orderly development
of urban and rural areas." '154 Congress directed the President to "pre-
scribe regulations governing the formulation, evaluation, and review of
United States Government programs and projects having a significant
impact on area and community development." '15 5 The Act identified
seven community objectives which a federal agency should consider as
it plans and develops projects: 156
1. appropriate land uses for housing, commercial, industrial,
governmental, institutions, and other purposes;
2. wise development and conservation of all natural resources;
3. balanced transportation system;
4. adequate outdoor recreation and open space;
5. protection of areas of unique natural beauty and historic and
scientific interest;
6. properly planned community facilities; and
7. concern for high standards of design.
Congress also established a policy that "to the extent possible, all
National, Regional, State, and local viewpoints shall be considered in
planning development programs and projects of the United States
Government." 1
57
The House Report accompanying the Intergovernmental Coopera-
tion Act of 1968 suggested that the primary concerns of the legislators
were:
1. to improve the operation of the federal system in an increas-
eral approval. However, the Commission cited the success within the District of Co-
lumbia, where federal law required that all federal projects be consistent with the local
comprehensive plan. Id.
153. 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (1983). The House and Conference Committee reports pre-
ceding the passage of the Act are reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs
4220-4252. The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 considers the coordination
of both federal assistance programs and direct federal development and activities. An
in-depth review of the federal assistance programs is beyond the scope of the Article.
Complete analysis of the impact of federal assistance activities in local jurisdictions has
been studied intensively by the Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations.
154. 31 U.S.C. at 6506(a).
155. Id. at 6506(b).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6506(c).
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ingly complex society, 158
2. to achieve the fullest cooperation and coordination of activi-
ties among various levels of government, 159 and
3. to strengthen state and local government.'
6
B. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95
The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968 obligated the Presi-
dent to establish regulations governing the formulation, evaluation,
and review of federal projects significantly affecting area and commu-
nity development. 16 1 From 1969 to 1982, the President fulfilled his
statutory responsibility by promulgating the Office of Management and
Budget Circular A-95. 162 Circular A-95 established a four part pro-
gram which detailed the consultation requirements of any applicant for
federal assistance, mandated that federal agencies planning any direct
federal development coordinate with state and local governments, pro-
vided governments with an opportunity to review various federal
formula grant programs, and encouraged consistency among federal
assisted planning programs.'
63
The purpose of Part II of Circular A-95 was "to assure maximum
feasible consistency of federal developments with state, area-wide, and
158. H.R. REP. No. 1845, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in, 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4220, 4220-2 1.
159. Id.
160. 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4228. A 1984 letter report by the
General Accounting Office suggests another justification for the Act. General Account-
ing Office, B-146,285, GGD-85-2, Issues Concerning Implementation of a Revised Pro-
cess for Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs (Oct. 17, 1984) (finding
intergovernmental cooperation is necessary to protect the vast investments of the federal
government in its own development activities).
161. 31 U.S.C. § 6506(b) (1983).
162. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95, reprinted in 41 Fed. Reg.
2052 (1976). Circular A-95 was first issued on July 24, 1969, and was revised at regular
intervals between that date and the last revision in 1976.
163. For the history and criticism of Circular A-95, see OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CIRCULAR A-95: AN ASSESS-
MENT (1978); M. MOGULOF, GOVERNING METROPOLITAN AREAS: A CRITICAL RE-
VIEW OF COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENT AND THE FEDERAL ROLE (1971); Gordon,
Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95: Perspectives and Implications, PUB-
LIUS, Winter 1974, at 45; Rothenberg, Regional Coordination of Federal Programs: Has
the Difficult Grown Impossible, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 1 (1984); Russo, In
Search of Intergovernmental Coordination: The A-95 Project Notification and Review
System, PUBLIUS, Spring 1982, at 49; Steinman, The A-95 Review Process: Suggestions
for a New Perspective, STATE & LOCAL GOV'T REV., Jan. 1982, at 32.
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local plans and programs." 164 In order to achieve "maximum feasible
consistency," A-95 placed the following duties on federal agencies:
1. To consult with State and local representatives "at the earliest
practicable stage in project or development planning" concerning
the relationship of the federal project to the development plans
and programs of the area in which the project is located. 165
2. To assure that any federal plan or project was compatible
with state, area-wide, and local development plans identified in the
course of consultations. The agency was obligated to explain, in
writing, any incompatibility to the appropriate state or local
governments. 166
3. To enter into agreements with state and local governments to
establish procedures for ongoing coordination between federal and
non-federal planning.167
Although Circular A-95 failed to fulfill its potential, it reduced some
duplication, encouraged project coordination, and provided a vehicle
for the expression of local opinion.' 68 Despite these achievements,
however, Circular A-95 was plagued by numerous problems.1 69 Dur-
164. Office of Management and Budget Circular A-95, Part II, l.b., reprinted in 41
Fed. Reg. 2056 (1976).
165. Id. at 2.a.(1). The Circular identified nine categories for comments and recom-
mendations from state and local governments:
1. consistency with state, area or local comprehensive planning;
2. extent to which the project duplicated other projects or activities;
3. extent to which the project contributed to achievement of state, area, and local
policies relating to natural and human resources and economic and community
development;
4. impacts on the environment;
5. effects on energy resources;
6. extent of displacement caused by project;
7. relationship to and consistency with coastal zone management plans;
8. effects on patterns of settlement; and
9. extent of impact on central cities, older suburban cities and other communities.
166. Id. at 2.a.(2).
167. Id. at 5.c.
168. Rothenberg, Regional Coordination of Federal Program, 4 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 1 (1984).
169. For various opinions concerning the failure of Circular A-95, see the sources
cited in note 163. Irene Fraser Rothenberg in her article, supra note 168, listed the
following weaknesses in the A-95 process:
1. Some state and local governments submitted poor quality comments, lacking
analysis and documentation of potential impacts. In those jurisdictions, federal officials
placed little emphasis on complying with the Circular, thereby demoralizing the state
and local governments and causing even more perfunctory subsequent reviews.
2. The poor quality of state and local government comments was attributed, in part,
[Vol. 33:3
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ing 1977 and 1978, the Office of Management and Budget studied the
Circular A-95 process 17' and identified its shortcomings. One impor-
tant finding of the study was that federal agencies frequently ignored
the Circular. In many cases, federal agencies simply did not notify
state and local governments of projects that affected their commu-
nity. 17 ' Even when the federal agency notified the community, the
agency often had already committed itself to the development, provid-
ing state and local governments with little opportunity to influence the
project. Generally, the federal agencies were uninformed about their
responsibilities under the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act and
under Circular A-95. 172
C. Executive Order 12,372
1. The Reagan Administration Policy of Deregulation and the De-
mise of Circular A-95. A continuous process of self-study and evalua-
tion during the 1970's identified several problems with the A-95
process. When President Reagan entered office in 1981, revised Circu-
lar A-95 was ready for publication. However, the new administration
felt that a more dramatic shift in the intergovernmental consultation
process was necessary. Consequently, it provided new direction under
Executive Order 12372, of July 12, 1982.171
to the lack of state agency and local government resources necessary to conduct thor-
ough reviews. Many review organizations lacked adequate personnel and financial as-
sets.
3. A-95 burdened state and local government review personnel with commenting on
many noncontroversial projects. The consideration of a large volume of less important
federal projects severely restricted the time which could have been spent on the most
troublesome programs.
4. State and local reviews were meaningful only if there was an established policy or
comprehensive development plan. Many governmental units, however, lacked these
policies and plans. Consequently, the participation of the governments in those situa-
tions was limited.
170. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET CIRCULAR A-95: AN ASSESSMENT (1978).
171. Id. at 7.
172, Id. at 12. The study recommended changes to the A-95 process to assure
greater federal agency compliance. The following were among the "options for action":
1. establish internal audit procedures within each agency to monitor compliance
with A-95; and
2. provide funding for a broad information and training program to instruct fed-
eral officials concerning their intergovernmental coordination responsibilities.
173. Exec. Order No. 12,372, 3 C.F.R. 1972 (1983), reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 6506
App. at 288-89 (1983), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,416, 3 C.F.R. 186 (1984),
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The Reagan Administration had pledged to reduce federal interfer-
ence and to restore power to local elected authorities. The new admin-
istration correctly found that the existing A-95 process was highly
bureaucratic and burdensome. 174 Executive Order 12372 satisfied the
Reagan Administration's commitment to "removing unnecessary
prescriptiveness and letting state and local officials design and oper-
ate-without federal interference-systems that are responsive to their
priorities."'
175
2. Executive Order 12372. Executive Order 12372 shifted the initi-
ative for establishing review procedures and priorities to the states and
local governments. Under the new system, each state would design its
own system for coordination with federal agencies. 176 The President
directed that once a state adopts a system of consultation, federal agen-
cies should "utilize the state process to determine official views of State
and local elected officials."
177
reprinted in 31 U.S.C. § 6506 (Supp. 1986). The recommendation to alter the A-95
process arose from the Vice President's Task Force on Regulatory Relief in 1982. Office
of Management and Budget, Report to the President on Executive Order 12,372: Inter-
governmental Review of Federal Programs (1985). For an analysis of Executive Order
12,372 and its impact on intergovernmental cooperation, see Advisory Commission on
intergovernmental Relations, Bulletin No. 82-3, Intergovernmental Consultation
Changes Provide Opportunities (1982); Council of State Planning Agencies, The Promise
of Partnership: A Status Report on Implementation of the President's Intergovernmental
Consultation Initiative (1984).
174. One estimate concluded that A-95 had created "a staggering paperwork bur-
den costing over $50 million each year-with little positive return to State and local
governments and their citizens." General Accounting Office, B-146,285, GGD-85-2,
Issues Concerning Implementation of a Revised Process for Intergovernmental Review
of Federal Programs 2 (Oct. 17, 1984).
175. Executive Order 12,372, Revised Procedures for Evaluation, Review, and Coor-
dination of Federal and Federally Assisted Programs and Projects: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 41 (1983) (statement of Joseph R. Wright, Jr., Deputy Direc-
tor of the Office of Management and Budget). See also Office of Management and
Budget Circular No. A-95: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Rela-
tions of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
176. Exec. Order No. 12,372, supra note 173, § 2.
177. Following the publication of the Executive Order, the federal agencies worked
together for several months to develop consistent regulations to implement the Order.
These regulations were published on June 24, 1983. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,096-29,414 (1983).
The regulations are similar for all twenty-three agencies which were subject to the Exec-
utive Order. Within these regulations, each agency listed those activities and projects
which it considered eligible for review and comment by state and local governments.
The lists submitted by a few agencies indicate the intent to cooperate with local govern-
ments during the planning phase of federal project development. Following are exam-
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Even though the Order shifted initiative to the states, the Reagan
Administration emphasized that federal agencies were not relieved of
their intergovernmental coordination responsibilities. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) announced that the Order required
that the federal government regulate itself to be responsive to state and
local government.17 8 The OMB emphasized that federal agencies
should accept the recommendations of state and local officials or ex-
plain their reasons for refusing to do so.1 7 9
To implement this policy, section 2 of the Order placed several re-
sponsibilities on federal agencies. First, the Order required federal
pies of the eligible federal activities given for some federal agencies with real property
holdings in urban communities:
Veterans Administration, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,103 (1983).
I. Acquisition of real property for national cemeteries and medical facilities.
2. Major utility modernization that may require new primary sources. 3. Major
buildings demolition projects. 4. Building additions. 5. New structures.
Department of Defense. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,140, 29,142 (1983).
1. Installation comprehensive master planning (including Natural Resource
Plans and Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Studies). 2. Military construction
and family housing. 3. Real property acquisition and disposal. 4. Substantial
changes in existing use of installations. 5. Floodplain management and wetlands
protection.
Department of Justice. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,248 (1983).
1. Construction projects such as correctional institutions and detention centers.
2. Construction of border patrol stations.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,339 (1983).
1. New or expanded buildings or utility systems on NASA installations. 2. Re-
vised site or operating plans at NASA field centers.
Postal Service. 48 Fed. Reg. 29,370, 29,376 (1983).
1. New facility construction, owned or leased. 2. Expansion of an existing facil-
ity. 3. Purchase or lease of an existing building if a new or substantially enlarged
occupancy is involved. 4. Real property disposal. 5. Other postal facility actions
that might directly affect state or local community plans.
This listing of program areas by the federal agencies evoked a sharp response from
the states and local governments. State officials interpreted the Executive Order as giv-
ing them the primary role in determining program coverage. See, Executive Order
12.372, Revised Procedures for Evaluation, Review, and Coordination of Federal and
Federally-Assisted Programs and Projects: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergov-
ernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
176-78 (1983) (statement of Constance Lieder, Secretary of State for Planning, Mary-
land); General Accounting Office, B-146285, GGD-85-2, Issues Concerning Implemen-
tation of a Revised Process for Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs 3-6
(Oct. 17, 1984).
178. Office of Management and Budget, Report to the President on the Implemen-
tation of Executive Order 12,372, Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs 1
(1985).
179. Id.
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agencies to communicate with state officials early in the program plan-
ning cycle to explain specific plans and actions.180 Moreover, the Or-
der urged each federal agency to accommodate state and local elected
officials' concern with proposed federal financial assistance and direct
federal development. 18' Finally, in those cases where the concerns of
the State and local elected officials cannot be accommodated, federal
officials should explain the basis for their decisions.' 82
Notwithstanding this strong statement of federal agency responsibil-
ity, the President exempted certain federal actions from the Order.' 8 3
These exceptions included: proposed federal legislation, regulations,
and budget formulation; classified programs or activities where formal
consultation would endanger national security; programs and activities
administered by federally-recognized Indian tribes; and research and
development activities not affecting state and local governments.
3. Federal Compliance under Executive Order 12,372. Although
the Order was a strong policy statement regarding federal agency com-
pliance,184 there is little reason to believe that federal agencies will vol-
untarily increase their coordination with state and local governments.
One reason is that the Reagan Administration policy intentionally
eliminated the previous federal intergovernmental cooperation proce-
dures, in order to reduce administrative burdens on local and state gov-
ernments.' 85 Another reason is that the Order gave states broad
discretion to fashion whatever comment procedures they believed were
necessary to satisfy state policies and priorities. In most cases, the state
procedures are much less onerous than the former A-95 require-
ments.18 6 Consequently, the procedural responsibilities of the federal
180. Exec. Order No. 12,372, supra note 173, § 2(b).
181. Id. at § 2(c).
182. Id. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget also felt that chang-
ing the presidential policy from an OMB circular to an Executive Order would increase
federal agency compliance. Office of Management and Budget, Report to the President
on the Implementation of Executive Order 12,372, Intergovernmental Review of Fed-
eral Programs 1 (1985).
183. Office of the Press Secretary of the President, Fact Sheet of Executive Order on
Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs (1982).
184. See text accompanying note 178.
185. See text accompanying note 174.
186. See generally Council of State Planning Agencies, The Promise of Partnership:
A Status Report on Implementation of the President's Intergovernmental Consultation
Initiative (1984). In addition to the particular procedures adopted by a state, the state's
political configuration and administrative capacity can play an important role in the
level of federal compliance.
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agencies have decreased. This relaxing of procedures decreased agency
familiarity with intergovernmental responsibilities.187
In the past, state and local agencies had at least one ally when they
encountered poor federal compliance. Under Circular A-95, the Office
of Management and Budget played an active role in overseeing the en-
tire intergovernmental coordination process. It often intervened in
cases of federal agency noncompliance.18 Since the publication of the
Executive Order, however, the Office of Management and Budget an-
nounced its intention to reduce its oversight role. i8 9 Each federal
agency is now separately responsible to police its compliance with Ex-
ecutive Order 12372.
4. Whether Executive Order 12,372 Embodies all the Statutory Re-
quirements of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. Execu-
tive Order 12372 states that it is based on the authority under "the
Constitution and Laws of the United States of America, including sec-
tion 401(a) of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968. " 19
Although the Executive Order cites the Act, it fails to expressly state
whether it intends to satisfy all the statutory requirements of that or
any other act. Since the Executive Order relies largely on state govern-
ment implementation, it is unclear whether the Order embodies the
entire Intergovernmental Cooperation Act.
For example, the Act states that "all National, Regional, State, and
local viewpoints shall be considered in planning development programs
and projects of the United States Government." 19' This language sug-
gests that federal agencies must take the initiative in considering, if not
soliciting, the viewpoints of other governmental bodies. By contrast,
the Executive Order delegates to the states the authority to design the
consultation process and to identify the matters to be coordinated. 192
187. Interview with Bruce McDowell, formerly with the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations, in Washington, D.C. (May 13, 1986).
188. Interview with Walter Grozek, Senior Management Analyst, Office of Man-
agement and Budget, in Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1986).
189. Memorandum from Harold I. Steinberg, Associate Director for Management,
Office of Management and Budget, To Interested Federal, State and Local Officials
(Jan. 28, 1983). Since the publication of Executive Order 12,372, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget has deleted its Intergovernmental Affairs Division, which had con-
sisted of approximately twenty people. Interview with Walter Grozek, Federal Agency
Liaison, Office of Management and Budget, in Washington, D.C. (May 23, 1986).
190. Exec. Order No. 12,372, supra note 137, preamble.
191. 31 U.S.C. § 6506(c) (1983).
192. Exec. Order No. 12,372, supra note 173, § 2.
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In exercising this duty under the Order, a state may limit the scope of
its cooperation procedures. If a federal agency relies solely on the state
process, it may fall short of the requirement under the Intergovern-
mental Cooperation Act to consider "all viewpoints."
In a question and answer statement, 193 the Office of Management
and Budget addressed the relationship between Executive Order 12,372
and the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act. One question asked
whether the states must establish a consultation process. In answering
this question, the Office of Management and Budget said that if a state
lacks an official consultation process, federal agencies should still con-
sider the views of state and local governments as required by the Inter-
governmental Cooperation Act; however, the agencies need not
accommodate the recommendations of state and local governments as
required under the Executive Order. 194
Another procedure adopted by the Executive Order suggests that the
order may not be as comprehensive as the act. In an effort to stream-
line the review process, the Executive Order designated the states as
the single point of contact for all official views transmitted to the fed-
eral agencies.195 While these state single-point-of-contact agencies
need not be the only channel of communication, the Order fails to obli-
193. Memorandum from Harold I. Steinberg, Associate Director for Management,
Office of Management and Budget, To Interested Federal, State, and Local Officials
(Jan. 28, 1983).
194. The testimony of Joseph R. Wright, Jr., Deputy Director of the Office of Man-
agement and Budget at a hearing before the Senate Subcommittee on intergovernmental
Relations reaffirmed this position.
I understand another area of concern is whether there will still be adherence to the
Intergovernmental Cooperation Act ... Let me assure you that these consulta-
tions will continue. The purpose of the Executive Order and the regulations is to
establish a special process whereby state and local governments can take matters of
specific concern, channel the comments through a specifically-designated office,
and assure that there would be an accommodation or explanation.
Executive Order 12,372, Revised Proceduresfor Evaluation, Review, and Coordination of
Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs and Projects: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
International Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st
Sess. 48-49 (1983).
195. Id. In response to question thirty-one of its Questions and Answers Policy
Statement, the Office of Management and Budget gave its reasoning for the single point
of contact concept.
The intent of the Executive Order is to have states and local governments work out
differences so that a single recommendation is communicated... Agencies will not
be in a good position to accommodate state and local concerns unless the state
speaks with one voice in its comments.
Memorandum from Harold I. Steinberg, supra note 193.
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gate federal agencies either to accommodate or to explain their inabil-
ity to accommodate views obtained from other sources. 196 This, of
course, places local governments at a disadvantage if they are unable to
win the support of the state single point of contact.
Of course, many conflicts with federal agencies occur at the local
level, rather than at the state level.' 97 When the Executive Order was
published, local government officials voiced strong opposition to the
state-oriented review system.' One local government representative
stated:
Local governments ... will pay the price of uncertainty and po-
tential disenfranchisement. Many local governments distrust state
government because of its historical neglect of local needs. These
localities fear that the State will consult with them only in a per-
functory fashion. They are concerned that States will establish a
project review system that provides too short a list of projects sub-
ject to review and inadequate notification of affected parties at the
local level. Moreover, localities suspect that states will give inade-
quate weight for local views in developing "a single state view.",
19 9
The Executive Order single point of contact mechanism may impede
the Act's requirement that federal agencies consider all views, whether
state, regional, or local.2 ° ° The Order placed local or area-wide com-
196. Id., Question 48.
197. See generally Office of Management and Budget, Report to the President on
Executive Order 12,372, Intergovernmental Review of Federal Programs 2-3 (1985).
The Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations concluded that local opin-
ions would be essential for an effective state process.
Local and regional reviews of projects often may have great significance in formu-
lating state comments. Local officials and regional bodies frequently are closer to
and more familiar with the intimate details and apparent implications of proposed
federal and federally assisted activities as well as related state, local and private
sector activities.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Bulletin No. 82-3, Intergovern-
mental Consultation Changes Provide Opportunities, at 8 (1982).
198. See 1982 and 1983 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, supra note 175.
199. Executive Order 12,372, Revised Procedures for Evaluation, Review, and Coor-
dination of Federal and Federally-Assisted Programs and Projects: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 103-04 (1983) (statement of Irving Hand, President, Ameri-
can Planning Association).
200. 31 U.S.C. § 6506(c) (1983). Regardless of its potential benefits for the effec-
tiveness of reviews, the concepts of the "single point of contact" suggests that the Rea-
gan Administration defines decentralization as a process of strengthening states, even if
it involves the erosion of local authority. This result violates the Office of Management
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ments in an inferior status if they are unable to garner State support.
20 1
There is no indication in the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act, how-
ever, that Congress intended the President to limit the significance of
certain categories of comments.
VII. ETHICAL DILEMMAS FACING THE FEDERAL AGENCY
DECISIONMAKER: POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED
VULNERABILITY OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
In evaluating the vulnerability of the federal government in negotia-
tions, an appreciation of the ethical dilemmas facing federal officers is
important. In public land use negotiations, the federal official who
feels a duty to be fair and open may weaken his bargaining position.
But, the federal agency negotiator must continually consider the extent
to which sharp practices will undermine his bargaining position. Thus,
he should consider whether certain types of conduct may subject him
to possible disciplinary action, to loss of authority as a negotiator, or to
loss of status in the agency. 20 2 Also, the public official must be aware
of how the other side, and his superiors, perceive his actions.
This section illustrates the conflicting responsibilities of federal offi-
and Budget's expressed policy of "neutrality" in the intergovernmental consultation
process. Memorandum from Harold I. Steinberg, supra note 189. See also M. GOOD-
MAN & M. WRIGHTSON, MANAGING REGULATORY REFORM: THE REAGAN STRAT-
EGY AND ITS IMPACT (1987) (citing the effectiveness of the plan to limit the federal role
in intergovernmental relations).
201. The Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations recommended sev-
eral ways by which local governments can increase their level of access and participa-
tion under the Executive Order:
1. establish policies and plans that are comprehensive, soundly based upon
fact, and widely accepted as the basis for local action;
2. build a strong track record of planning and policy continuity to build federal
agency confidence;
3. develop good communication with and access to the state single point of
contact agency; and
4. work together with state-wide organizations such as a state league of munici-
palities or similar organizations.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Bulletin No. 82-3, Intergovern-
mental Consultation Changes Provide Opportunities 12-15 (1982).
202. Another negative consequence from sharp practices is the requirement to pay
the opposing party's attorneys fees, when the government official acts in "bad faith."
Thus, where a federal agency withholds information from an opposing party in an ad-
ministrative or judicial action, the federal agency may be liable for the opposing party's
attorney fees. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 590 F.
Supp. 1509 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (Sierra Club 111), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other
grounds, 776 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1985).
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cials. A local government, of course, may gain leverage in the negotiat-
ing process when it convinces a federal officer that he is guilty of
neglecting an important public or personal duty.
A. The Federal Official's Dilemmas of Responsibility
Administrative officers within the various federal agencies make
most of the decisions concerning the development and use of federal
real property. These people should make choices based on their best
assessment of the public interest. However, they are frequently faced
with conflicts between competing principles, rules, agreements and ide-
als that exist in the government and in society.
In analyzing the ethical dilemmas of these federal decisionmakers,
the concept of responsibility plays a central role.2°3 Responsibility in
this context includes the concepts of discretion and accountability.
While a federal administrator may be granted considerable discretion
or freedom to act on behalf of his agency, he must still answer for his
choices to superiors, agency associates, the courts, and the public atlarge.2°
Dilemmas arise for public decisionmakers when responsibilities or
obligations conflict or are unclear. Among the potentially competing
or ambiguous obligations are express or implied commitments made by
the federal officer. For example, an administrative officer may be obli-
gated to fulfill an implied promise to serve faithfully or to be an advo-
cate for his agency's interests. Moreover, the federal official may feel
203. K. ANDERSON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 323-28 (1971) (arguing
that a public official's acceptance of responsibility is a key to unraveling the ethical
dilemmas). For a discussion of the many sources of administrative agency responsibil-
ity, see J. FLEISHMAN & B. PAYNE, ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND THE EDUCATION OF
POLICYMAKERS (1980); Richardson & Nigro, Administrative Ethics and Founding
Thought: Constitutional Correctives, Honor, and Education, 47 PUB. AD. REV. 367
(1987). There is lack of agreement among land use planners regarding their ethical
obligations. See ETHICS IN PLANNING (M. Wachs ed. 1984); Howe & Kaufman, The
Values of Contemporary American Planners, 47 J. AM. PLAN. A. 266 (1981); Howe &
Kaufman, The Ethics of Contemporary American Planners, 45 J. AM. PLAN. A. 243
(1979). For an analysis of the conflicts between institutional loyalties and personal
moral standards, or private versus public morality, see S. HAMPSHIRE, MORALITY AND
CONFLICT (1983); D. JONES, PRIVATE AND PUBLIC ETHICS: TENSIONS BETWEEN
CONSCIENCE AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1978).
204. See T. GREENWOOD, KNOWLEDGE AND DISCRETION IN GOVERNMENT REG-
ULATION (1984) (discussing federal agency implementation of congressional policy, the
influence of special interest groups, values of federal decisionmakers, and the proper
degree of administrative discretion).
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
56 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 33:3
committed to abide by certain rules of conduct within his profession, or
by agency custom.
Also, a federal officer may feel responsible to his associates and
others.20 5 Loyalties to agency co-workers, supervisors, or fellow pro-
fessionals206 may be included among the public decisionmaker's com-
mitments. Of course, the federal officer can also develop loyalties
towards a particular urban or rural community, its leaders and elected
officials.20 7 However, these personal associations within the agency
and otherwise are distinguishable from the officer's broader duties to
the public as a whole.20 8
The dilemmas which occur among these diverse obligations are not
easily resolved. Often, the hard choices resemble several strands of re-
sponsibility knotted together.20 9 Unfortunately, the decisionmaker is
205. See generally, P. FRENCH, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 124-27 (1983).
206. Professionals in our society have a high degree of autonomy, which can lead to
a distortion of behavior when they occupy positions of public responsibility. E.
REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 52-53 (1969); Brown, Ethics
and Public Policy. A Preliminary Agenda, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 132, 133-34 (1978).
207. Some commentators contend that public decisionmaking should be based on
"community" needs. For a definition of "community" and the argument that policy-
makers must consider community interests, see H. ODEGARD, THE POLITICS OF
TRUTH: TOWARD RECONSTRUCTION IN DEMOCRACY 147-361 (1971); M. RASKIN,
THE COMMON GOOD: ITS POLITICS, POLICIES AND PHILOSOPHY (1986); C. RYN, DE-
MOCRACY AND THE ETHICAL LIFE: A PHILOSOPHY OF POLITICS AND COMMUNITY
81-89 (1978); Price, Community, "Mediating Structures" and Public Policy, 62 SOUND-
INGS 369 (1979).
208. In addition to these general categories of responsibility, the public official may
feel an obligation to future generations. H. JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBIL-
ITY: IN SEARCH OF AN ETHIC FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 38-46 (1984); Care,
Future Generations, Public Policy, and the Motivation Problem, 4 ENVTL. ETHICS 195
(1982). Of course, personal moral codes, based on religion, philosophy, instinct or tra-
dition, may also restrain actions or decisions. Additionally, one's own desires and ca-
reer ambitions may influence bureaucratic behavior. F. FISCHER, POLITICS, VALUES,
AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980).
209. To evaluate competing ethical values, the administrative official must under-
stand the conflict between personal morality and public duty. P. FRENCH, ETHICS IN
GOVERNMENT 5-14 (1983). Those commentators who have considered the public sec-
tor responsibilities describe a system of overlapping, conflicting and competing values.
T. COOPER, THE RESPONSIBLE ADMINISTRATOR: AN APPROACH TO ETHICS FOR THE
ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE 61-93 (1984); Milward & Rainey, Don't Blame the Bureau-
cracy!, 3 J. PUB. POL'Y 149 (1983) (claiming that administrative agencies' ethical con-
flicts are great because they get the "messy" jobs in society). Regrettably, the United
States Supreme Court has failed to provide direction helping administrative agencies
resolve policy conflicts. See J. ROHR, ETHICS FOR BUREAUCRATS: AN ESSAY ON LAW
AND VALUES 67-76 (1978). Of course, the values associated with public decisionmak-
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forced to act in the face of competing commitments.2 1 °
1. The Obligation to the Public Interest. When a proposed federal
action and the legitimate concerns of a local government conflict, the
federal decisionmaker must decide what is in the public's interest. The
concept of "public interest," however, is often too vague to guide the
official's decisions.21' In a sense, the federal officer's determination of
public interest merely reflects the more general battle of ethical
dilemmas.
Of course, procedural requirements in the law can increase the likeli-
hood of identifying the common good and in promoting well-reasoned
decisionmaking.212 Despite these procedural rules, decisionmakers
should not always follow the recommendations proffered during the
procedural process. Under certain circumstances, public officers are
expected to use their discretion to decide that the procedural system
has failed to identify the common good. In such cases, the process
gives discretion to a public official with a superior understanding of the
long-term consequences of a particular alternative.
2. The Obligation to the Procedural Law. Despite the skill of many
public officials in determining the public interest, they should guard
against arrogance. The stated purpose of the procedural guarantees is
the protection of those less powerful and less influential in the political
process.213 Cities and other local governments fall in this category
ing are constantly changing. See Levine, The Federal Government in the Year 2000:
Administrative Legacies of the Reagan Years, 46 PUB. AD. REV. 195 (1986).
Despite these difficulties, public officials can learn about the various values underlying
the many decisions they make. Anderson, The Place of Principles in Policy Analysis, 73
AM. POL. SC. REV. 711 (1979). They can also learn how to distribute responsibility
among the various parties affected by a decision. H. SPIRO, RESPONSIBILITY IN Gov-
ERNMENT: THEORY AND PRACTICE 101-04 (1969).
210. Numerous authors have attempted to describe an analytical framework for val-
uing competing administrative responsibilities. See, e.g., Brown, Ethics and Public Pol-
icy, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 132, 135-36 (1978); Fischer, Ethical Discourse in Public
Administration, 15 AD. & Soc'Y 5 (1983); Yates, Hard Choices: Justifying Bureaucratic
Decisions, in PUBLIC DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFI-
CIALS 32 (J. Fleishman, L. Liebman, & M. Moore eds. 1981).
211. See, McEachern & Al-Arayed, Discerning the Public Interest, 15 AD. & SOC'Y
439 (1984). An argument can be made that public interest cannot be distinguished from
sectional and group interests. M. REIN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 98-101
(1976).
212, See generally D. YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR
DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 149-79 (1982).
213. The weak political position of local governments is articulated in R. RIPLEY,
POLICY ANALYSIS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 74-83 (1985). For a convincing argument
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where federal land use decisions affect urban and rural communities.
These local units of government depend, to a large extent, on proce-
dural rights for their protection.
Strict adherence to procedural requirements214 will result in substan-
tial openness in the decisionmaking process.215 Nevertheless, Ameri-
cans have come to accept withholding of information by government
agencies as part of their culture.2 16 While the federal officer may
deceive or withhold information in representing his agency, such de-
ception may prove harmful in the long run. Federal officers who lose
their reputation for veracity may accomplish less thereafter.217
that cities should have at least as much power as private corporations, see Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980).
214. For a discussion of the doctrine of procedural democracy, see Dahl, On Re-
moving Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States, 92 POL. SC. Q. 1, 10-13
(1977). But see J. WHOLEY, EVALUATION AND EFFECTIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
(1983) (downplaying the focus on process, while arguing for a results-oriented public
decisionmaking model).
215. One scholar suggested two reasons why government agencies should more
freely share their information. First, in countries founded on principles of self-govern-
ment, the state must share its information to increase the individual's reflective ability to
comply with or to disobey the law. Second, man is a rational creature for whom knowl-
edge is an object of delight for the possessor, simply for its own sake. A government
that fails to account for our natural curiosity and unlimited interests fails to take into
account a potent factor in the nature of its citizens. Bedau, The Government's Responsi-
bility to Inform the Public, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT 221 (N. Bowie ed.
1981). Another writer noted that the concept of informed consent in the practice of
medicine could be extended to the area of public decisionmaking. Brown, Ethics and
Public Policy: A Preliminary Agenda, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 132, 136 (1978). See also Allen
v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984) (discussing duty of the federal gov-
ernment to disclose information about nuclear weapons testing).
In actual practice, the federal government's efforts to inform public and local govern-
ments is not uniform. See R. DENTON & G. WOODWARD, POLITICAL COMMUNICA-
TION IN AMERICA 98-136, 327-33 (1985) (discussing the various public agency
responses to special interest group pressure); Eisenberg, Government and the Excluded,
76 NAT'L CIVIC REV. 374 (1987). Two researchers found that federal agencies' willing-
ness to coordinate with outsiders followed a cyclical pattern. Burns & Mauet, Adminis-
trative Freedom for Intergovernmental Action: A Life-Cycle Interpretation, 16 AD. &
Soc'y 289 (1984). For a case history of federal agency avoidance of a congressionally
mandated disclosure and cooperation requirement, see Morehouse, The 1962 Highway
Act: A Study in Artful Interpretation, 35 J. AM. INST. PLANNERS 160 (1969).
216. See W. JONES, SURVIVAL: A MANUAL ON MANIPULATING (1979). For a
general discussion of the use of deception by governmental leaders, see S. BOK, LYING:
MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 203-19 (1978).
217. One example is former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, who resigned after his
public duty required him to withhold information from the European allies during the
Iranian Hostage Crisis. See P. FRENCH, ETHICS IN GOVERNMENT 5-14 (1983).
Despite the potential for harm caused by official deception, the barriers to it still seem
[Vol, 33:3
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol33/iss1/2
LAND USE NEGOTIATIONS
On the other hand, valid public interest reasons can justify the with-
holding of information. Some deception, for example, is necessitated
by national security, or in crisis situations.218 But even in a legitimate
case of national security or similar public interest, public officials
should accept the risk of possible injury to intergovernmental relations.
The failure to inform property owners or communities of an action
which later affects them can lead to a loss of support and cooperation
thereafter. Erosion of local support may occur even if the excluded
parties are subsequently informed of the public need for the withhold-
ing. Clearly, federal officials should consider the long-term conse-
quences219 and the gravity of harm to the general public of withholding
information.
weak. The reason is that some form of competitive or strategic deception is ingrained in
our expectations. Local government officials, for example, may not expect candor from
a large federal agency. In fact, local government leaders may relish and gain public
popularity by sparring with the federal government. For example, recently state and
local leaders gained notoriety by opposing the Federal Government's public lands poli-
cies. See W. COONS, THE SAGEBRUSH REBELLION: LEGITIMATE ASSERTION OF
STATES RIGHTS OR RETROACTIVE LAND GRAB (1981); Shapiro, Sagebrush and Sea-
weed Robbery: State Revenue Losses From Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12
ECOLOGY L.Q. 481 (1985).
218. National security is a difficult concept to define. See S. BOK, LYING: MORAL
CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 107-22 (1978); L. BROWN, REDEFINING NA-
TIONAL SECURITY (1977); A. Cox, THE MYTHS OF NATIONAL SECURITY (1975); I.
WILL, THE BIG BROTHER SOCIETY (1983); McDonald, The Possibility of Enhancing
National Security by Accelerating the Leasing of Federal Lands, REV. REGIONAL ECON.
& Bus., Apr. 1983, at 3; Margolis, Democracy and the Responsibility to Inform the
Public, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT 237 (N. Bowie ed. 1981); Wolfers, "Na-
tional Security" as an Ambiguous Symbol, 67 POL. Sci. Q. 481 (1952). The tension
between emergencies and information disclosure provides a continuing ethical dilemma.
Important values such as national security or security may be used to justify proce-
dure avoidance. But such justification poses obvious dangers. The claim of an
emergency may be used to prevent any thoughtful consideration of the issues at
stake. While the claim can be valid, it can also be used to stampede officials and
citizens and to limit legitimate objections of opponents.
J. FLEISHMAN & B. PAYNE, ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND THE EDUCATION OF POLICY-
MAKERS 22 (1980). See also, J. SHAKLAR, ORDINARY VICES (1984) (discussing the role
of deception in public life).
219. Public officials should consider all long-term consequences of their decisions.
A clear appreciation of the consequences of many public agency decisions is problem-
atic today. H. JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN
ETHIC FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 27-31 (1984). One solution to help reduce un-
certainty would be an increased effort by all public agencies to implement early, cooper-
ative planning. See H. ODEGARD, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH: TOWARD
RECONSTRUCTION IN DEMOCRACY 344-55 (1971) (noting that cooperative, comprehen-
sive planning between public agencies represents one of the most difficult tests of ethics
in a bureaucracy). For a discussion of the issue of public disclosure in government
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3. The Obligation to Democracy. One way to resolve the conflicts
among policy choices is to make all decisions conform to a theory of
democracy.22 ° Although democracy is difficult to define, it is generally
understood that public decisions in a democratic state should reflect
the will of the people. Since an unelected administrative officer can be
unresponsive to the individual needs of the voters, the officer is re-
quired to comply with certain procedural requirements. 22 I Although
minimum procedures may vary, they often include notice to the af-
development project decisionmaking, see J. SELEY, THE POLITICS OF PUBLIC-FACILITY
PLANNING (1983).
220. K. ANDERSON, PERSUASION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 319-21 (1971) (dis-
cussing ethics of decisionmaking in a democracy). A full discussion of the relationship
between bureaucratic organization and democratic principles is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a more comprehensive analysis, see E. ETZIONI-HALEVY, BUREAUCRACY
AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL DILEMMA (1983); M. REIN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY 98-101 (1976); H. SPIRO, RESPONSIBILITY IN GOVERNMENT: THEORY
AND PRACTICE (1969).
One author identified several reasons why public agencies are reluctant to coordinate
their activities with those outside the agency. Among the reasons are the following:
1. Federal agencies tend to act as self-conscious political interest groups.
2. The duties of the agencies are often so narrowly defined as to limit their
ability to consider universal principles.
3. Given the jurisdictional authority of the government agencies, it is easy to
avoid responsibility.
4. Goals are elusive, and mandates are loose.
5. Important policymaking often occurs in a setting sheltered from political
debate and citizen scrutiny when compared with policy making processes involving
elected officials.
D. YATES, BUREAUCRATIC DEMOCRACY: THE SEARCH FOR DEMOCRACY AND EFFI-
CIENCY IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 66-100 (1982). See also Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1277 (1984).
221. In those areas of federal decisionmaking where there is potential for serious
impacts on public health, there is growing political pressure for the adoption of a federal
right-to-know law. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, RIGHT-To-KNOW: A REGULA-
TORY UPDATE ON PROVIDING CHEMICAL HAZARD INFORMATION (1985). Others
urge expansion of government disclosure requirements in all areas of public policymak-
ing. D. DEMAC, KEEPING AMERICA UNINFORMED: GOVERNMENT SECRECY IN THE
1980'S 53-72 (1984) (complaining that the Reagan Administration effort to streamline
paperwork impairs the public's ability to control the bureaucracy); Swiss, Holding
Agencies Accountable for Efficiency: Learning From the Past Failures, 15 AD. & Soc'Y
75 (1983). See also Rosenbaum, The Paradoxes of Public Participation, 8 AD. & Soc'Y
355 (1976) (discussing the complex social and political issues associated with public
participation in government decisionmaking).
One author clearly defined the process of disclosure and coordination under a demo-
cratic system:
Workable democracy is achieved in public affairs through the interaction of leaders
of different types in strategic positions of influence, who are forced by the interac-
tion process, the complexity of interest involved in a decisionmaking situation, and
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fected parties, access to unbiased forums for debate, and provisions for
appeal to an independent reviewing body.
the access of nonleaders to their positions to give attention to all the interests in the
society.
E. REDFORD, DEMOCRACY IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 199-200 (1969). There is
a danger that the agency will simply ignore excessive input from outsiders because the
agency is unable to assimilate it. See De Parle, Advise and Forget, WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, May 1983, at 40 (discussing the lack of impact of the one thousand plus
Presidential Commissions). Many agency officials justify their failure to disseminate
information on the need to cut back on paperwork.
A common reaction to procedures designed to guarantee fairness is that they are at
best a necessary evil, and at worst, "red tape," far more likely to frustrate policy-
makers than to improve it.... [O]ne reason fairness requirements delay decisions
is that they are often met insincerely, and at too late a stage in the decision process.
When fair hearing and review requirements are invoked by parties unfairly frozen
out of the crucial decision processes, the stage is set for protracted and bitter
conflict.
J. FLEISHMAN & B. PAYNE, ETHICAL DILEMMAS AND THE EDUCATION OF POLICY-
MAKERS 38 (1980). Another writer listed several factors which indicate the willingness
of one agency to cooperate with another.
1. Whether the public agency is threatened with the loss of autonomy, resources, or
power, which threat can be reduced through cooperation;
2. Whether the decisionmaking agency perceives the outside agency as having pres-
tige and as being effective in its own programs;
3. Whether there is a perception that the two agencies are at least partially interde-
pendent;
4. Whether the rewards accrued from a coordination effort will clearly outweigh the
cost to the decisionmaking agency;
5. Whether agency policy is generally supportive of coordination wiih outside orga-
nizations. Halpert, Antecedents, in INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION: THE-
ORY, RESEARCH AND IMPLEMENTATION 54 (D. Rodgers & D. Whetten eds. 1982).
Federal agencies frequently find themselves in positions where they need the assist-
ance of local governments. See Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks from the Exter-
nal Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1985); Pearlman & Waite,
Controlling Land Use and Population Growth Near Nuclear Power Plants, 27 WASH.
U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 9 (1984); Sylves, Nuclear Power Plants and Emergency Plan-
ning: An Intergovernmental Nightmare, 44 PUB. AD. REV. (1984). One author pro-
vided a five part test of agency moral conduct:
1. Exercise of discretion should serve the public interest.
2. Agency officials should avoid strict adherence to the organizational routines and
conventional wisdom of their agencies.
3. Officers must be truthful in all dealings with the public and with the agency.
Decisionmakers should comply with the established procedures, which are the single
most important source of accountability.
4. Decisionmakers should comply with the established procedures, which are the
single most important source of accountability.
5. Officials should avoid accomplishing organizational ends with means that violate
the law or undermine citizen trust in government. Warwick, The Ethics ofAdministra-
live Discretion, in PUBLIC DUTIES: THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF-
FICIALS 93 (J. Fleishman, L. Liebman & M. Moore eds. 1981). See also R. BELL, THE
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Of course, such procedural rights are not the only means by which
the people express their will in a democratic system. The people elect
legislators and executive officers to draft, enact and enforce public
laws. Such statutes very specifically direct federal agencies to imple-
ment general policies and courses of action,22 2 including federal devel-
opment projects on federal land in urban areas. A local community
exercising its full procedural rights can jeopardize these legislatively
directed projects. At this juncture, the federal agency decisionmaker
faces a dilemma. If he agrees to accommodate the local opinion, the
official risks project delay. In some cases, the process leads to debate so
intense and prolonged as to make completion of the legislative mandate
impossible.2 23 In confronting this dilemma, some officials choose to
provide only limited access to the decisionmaking process in order to
move forward with the project.
B. The Dilemma of Choice in Federal Land Use Decisions
Because of his conflicting responsibilities, the public sector deci-
sionmaker must analyze the values and interests at stake in all matters
with which he is concerned. In the area of land use control, the public
official's duty is even more difficult because of the nature of the social
values at issue.22 4 Any particular land use decision may involve eco-
CULTURE OF POLICY DELIBERATIONS (1985) (recommending a "legal culture" to con-
trol bureaucratic decisionmaking). See also S. BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUB-
LIC AND PRIVATE LIFE (1978).
222. See E. BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A
BILL BECOMES A LAW 98-147, 221-47 (1977) (discussing conflicts between public agen-
cies and special interest groups after Congress passes legislation).
223. Some argue that the mandate for "perfect planning" leads inevitably to paraly-
sis of agency action. Behan, RPA/NFMA-A Time to Punt, 79 J. FORESTRY 802
(1981). Others find that public involvement in land use planning processes takes deci-
sionmaking improperly away from experienced land managers and gives it to lawyers
and others who, together, lack common sense. Fairfax, RPA and the Forest Service, in
A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE FOREST AND RANGELANDS RENEWABLE RESOURCES
PLANNING ACT 205 (WV. Shands ed. 1981).
224. See H. JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF AN
ETHIC FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1984); M. REIN, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC
POLICY 136-38 (1976); J. PETULA, AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTALISM: VALUES, TAC-
TICS, PRIORITIES (1980); Ezrahri, The Jensen Controversy: A Study in the Ethics and
Politics of Knowledge in Democracy, in CONTROVERSIES AND DECISIONS: THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY 149 (C. Frankel ed. 1976); Manheim, Ethical Issues in
Environmental Impact Assessment, 2 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV. 315 (1981).
See also Humphrey & Buttel, The Sociology of the Growth/No-Growth Debate, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY FORMULATION: THE IMPACT OF VALUES, IDEOLOGY AND
STANDARDS 125 (D. Mann ed. 1981).
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logical and social welfare values, individual rights, aesthetics, historical
and cultural perspectives, and similar quality of life values. Due to the
complexity of these factors, the potential exists for the personal value
judgments of the public official to influence the shape of the ultimate
decision.
Reliance on the personal judgment of the public decisionmaker,
though problematic, is an accepted part of the governing process.
Analysis cannot go on forever and in the end a choice must be made.
Yet the requirement that the decisionmaker consider all reasonable op-
tions safeguards against abuse of discretion. This process which forces
an administrative officer to uncover alternatives arises from the as-
sumption that an open decisionmaking system will serve the public
good.
Responsible public decisionmakers may find an advantage in the
testing of logic which occurs in an open forum. Many public officers
recognize the need to be separated from illogical positions within their
agency. By extending participation in the decisionmaking process be-
yond the borders of his organization, the administrative official can
build confidence in the integrity of the system and in his own fairness
and responsibility as a decisionmaker.
VIII. THE POTENTIAL EFFECT OF A LOCAL GOVERNMENT'S
SKILLFUL NEGOTIATING EFFORT
Many federal agency officials attach great importance to their duty
as agency advocates. As stated in the introduction to this Article, the
advocacy role of public institutions, including federal agencies and lo-
cal governments, is an accepted part of our system of government. We
assume that this political haggling between the various units of govern-
ment leads to policy decisions which satisfy the public need. This sec-
tion attempts to identify the vulnerabilities of federal agencies in land
use controversies with local governments.
A. Negotiation as the Essence of Local Government-Federal
Agency Problem Solving
Local governments and federal agencies seldom resolve their con-
flicts in court or in a formal administrative proceeding. More com-
monly, negotiation resolves the controversy.225 In negotiations, federal
225. See G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF
EXPERIENCE (1986); P. CULHANE, PUBLIC LANDS POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP IN-
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agencies may seek to influence the outcome of the negotiations by
claiming preemptive, authority under the supremacy clause, exclusive
legislation clause, or some other constitutional power.226 The presence
of federal power may create the perception that local governments are
incapable of stopping the federal government.
Those familiar with the art of negotiation,227 however, understand
FLUENCE ON THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 22-29,
232-46 (1981).
226. E.g., United States v. McGee, 714 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1983); Jampoler, The
Navy as Neighbor, PROCEEDINGS U.S. NAVAL INST., Sept. 1982, at 51.
227. For a general discussion of the art of negotiation, see S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN
& F. SANDER, DisPuTE RESOLUTION 19-89 (1985); R. KUHN, DEALMAKER: ALL THE
NEGOTIATING SKILLS AND SECRETS (1988); B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION
(1984) (available from the National Law Center, The George Washington University);
Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31 U.
KAN. L. REV. 69 (1982). There are several theories of negotiation. The two more
prominent, competitive negotiation and problem-solving negotiation, are compared in
Murray, Understanding Competing Theories of Negotiation, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 179
(1986). The problem-solving theory of negotiation is advocated in the book R. FISHER
& W. URY, GETTING TO YES (1981). Fisher and Ury describe a principled negotiation
process where issues are decided on their merits. The Fisher and Ury approach has five
basic themes.
1. Separate the people from the problem. The parties should see themselves as at-
tacking the problem, not each other.
2. Focus on interests not positions. A position is what the party wants. An interest
is why the party wants it. Focusing on interests may reveal mutual or complementary
interests that will make agreement possible.
3. Invent options for mutual gain. Even if the parties' interests differ, there may be
bargaining outcomes that will advance the interests of both.
4. Insist on objective criteria to govern the outcome.
5. Know your best alternative to a negotiated agreement. The reason you negotiate
with someone is to produce better results than you could obtain without negotiating
with that person. If you are unaware of what results you could obtain if the negotia-
tions are unsuccessful, you risk entering into an agreement that you would be better off
rejecting or rejecting an agreement that you would be better off entering into.
For other discussions of this problem-solving negotiation theory, see F. JANDT, WIN-
WIN NEGOTIATING: TURNING CONFLICT INTO AGREEMENT (1985); L. SUSSKIND & J.
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING
PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987); Byrnes, Applying Negotiating Theory to Real-Life Bargaining
Situations on the Municipal Level, 15 J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION PUB. SECTOR 25
(1986); Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiations: The Structure of
Problem Solving, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 754 (1984); Straus, Collaborating to Under-
stand-Without Being a "Wimp," 2 NEGOTIATION J. 155 (1986).
Advocates of the competitive theory of negotiation assert that the Getting to Yes is
naive because it fails to acknowledge that the outcome of bargaining turns on the re-
spective ability of the parties to exert leverage. See White, The Pros and Cons of "Get-
ting to Yes," 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 115 (1984). For the classic competitive or leverage-
centered theory of negotiation, see B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION (1984); T.
[Vol. 33:3
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that a party's ability to gain an advantage over another is not always
directly related to the legal authority possessed by any one party.2 28 In
fact, a weaker party with an awareness and understanding of the con-
cepts of successful negotiation can gain the advantage over another.
Generally, a skillful negotiator is alert to any advantage which may
permit effective exploitation or defense.2 29 Of course, one such advan-
tage may be the effective use of legal process. For example, a threat to
use a judicial or an administrative dispute-resolution process2 30 may
lead to consensus. The point is that local governments may have cer-
tain situational opportunities which give them special advantage or lev-
erage in dealing with federal agencies.23 1 Although these advantages
do not guarantee the local government's success over the federal gov-
SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960). For Fisher's rebuttal to the criti-
cism of Getting to Yes, see Fisher, Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence, 27
AM. BEHAV. SCI. 149 (1983).
Some students of negotiation theory suggest that negotiations between government
organizations traditionally lack adequate consideration of the needs of the citizens, who
are third parties to the negotiation process. See L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 362 (1984); Bish, Intergovernmental Relations in the
United States, in INTERORGANIZATIONAL POLICY MAKING: LIMITS TO COORDINA-
TION AND CENTRAL CONTROL 19 (K. Hanf and F. Scharpf eds. 1978); Pollack,
Reimagining NEPA: Choices for Environments, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 359 (1985).
For a review of negotiation in land development disputes, see T. SULLIVAN, RESOLV-
ING DEVELOPMENT DISPUTES THROUGH NEGOTIATIONS (1984); Forester, Planning in
the Face of Conflict: Negotiation and Mediation Strategies in Local Land Use Regula-
tion, 53 J. AM. PLAN A. 303 (1987). Participants in land use control disputes typically
view themselves in a competitive bargaining atmosphere, rather than engaged in prob-
lem-solving. See S. PLOTKIN, KEEP OUT: THE BATTLES FOR LAND USE CONTROL
(1986).
228. See Lax & Sebenius, Interests: The Measure of Negotiation, 2 NEGOTIATION J.
73 (1986); Susskind & McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3
YALE J. ON REG. 133, 153-54 (1985).
229. X. FRASCOGNA & H. HETHERINGTON, NEGOTIATION STRATEGY FOR LAW-
YERS 11-26 (1984); Goleman, Influencing Others: Skills are Identified, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 18, 1986, at Cl, col. 1.
230. Administrative dispute resolution forums are becoming popular in resolving
land use disputes. G. BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DEC-
ADE OF EXPERIENCE (1985); Susskind and Ozawa, Mediated Negotiation in the Public
Sector: The Planner as Mediator, J. PLAN. EDUC. & RESEARCH, Aug. 1984, at 5. See
also Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 668 (1986); Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement
and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976).
231. For a discussion of the techniques and problems of power mobilization, see M.
DFVTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT: CONSTRUCTIVE AND DESTRUCTIVE
PROCESSES (1973); J. HIMES, CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (1980); THE
SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY POWER (W. Hawley & F. Wirt eds. 1974).
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ernment, the local government's recognition and skillful use of leverage
increases its chances of a favorable result.2 32
In its simplest form, leverage is merely exploitable substantive or
procedural advantage. Special advantage or leverage exists when the
real or perceived cost of disagreement is so great that the party feeling
the disproportionate cost is more easily pressured into agreement.233
Obviously, the party with the harder facts is in a better bargaining situ-
ation because of the substantive advantage it enjoys. Strength can also
be derived from the process associated with the dialogue, including de-
velopments in the less formal communications between the parties, 34
and any tacit communication.2 35 Another advantage may simply be a
232. R. COBB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DY-
NAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING (1972) (classic discussion of the public's influence on
"elite decisionmaking"). One author suggested that the absence of power is not neces-
sarily a limiting factor in a party's attempt to influence the outcome of a bargaining
situation.
The balance of political power does not necessarily dictate the outcome of informal
dispute resolution or consensus-building efforts. There are numerous ways that
less politically powerful groups can defend their interests and even dominate what
happens at the bargaining table. Coalitions among politically less powerful groups,
for example, can alter anticipated outcomes. Groups experienced in face-to-face
negotiation, even those with ostensibly less political power, can do surprisingly well
if they know how to present and argue effectively for their interests. Effective per-
suasion, solid information, and a battery of good ideas can equalize the power of all
parties in a dispute.
Susskind, Mediating Public Disputes, 1 NEGOTIATION J. 117, 118 (1985).
Of course, disputes in the public sector may be difficult to resolve because of the
diversity of issues and the impossibility of defining the public good. See H. RAIFFA,
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 257-335 (1982).
233. See S. BACHARACH & E. LAWLER, BARGAINING, POWER, TACTICS AND
OUTCOMES (1981); B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION (1984); Lax & Sebenius,
Interests: The Measure of Negotiation, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 73 (1986); Tedeschi & Do-
noma, Measures of Last Resort: Coercion and Aggression in Bargaining, in NEGOTIA-
TIONS, SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 213 (D. Druckman ed. 1977).
234. Bernard Ramundo suggests a global approach to negotiations, where the nego-
tiator uses every contact with the other side to further his position. "Chance" meetings
or contacts on other matters, give the negotiator an opportunity to probe the other
side's position and to "best orchestrate, manipulate, and exploit apprehension, uncer-
tainty and expectations." B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 66-67 (1984).
235. The skill of interpreting tacit communication is important for the successful
negotiator to expose the other side's true intentions or position. For a general discus-
sion of the practice and exposure of deception in society, see D. DRUCKMAN, R. Ro-
ZELLE & J. BAXTER, NONVERBAL COMMUNICATION: SURVEY, THEORY AND
RESEARCH (1982); P. EDMAN, TELLING LIES: CLUES TO DECEIT IN THE MARKET-
PLACE, POLITICS AND MARRIAGE (1985); J. WIEMANN & R. HARRISON, NONVERBAL
INTERACTION (1983); Thompson, Deception and the Concept of Behavioral Design, in
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disparity in the skill level of the respective negotiators.23 6 Similarly, a
negotiating misstep, such as a premature disclosure of information,
may present the other side with an opportunity for a more favorable
result.2 37 In summary, attention by a local government or federal
agency only on the facts or the merits will disadvantage that
organization.23 8
DECEPTION: PERSPECTIVES ON HUMAN AND NONHUMAN DECEIT 53 (R. Mitchell &
N. Thompson eds. 1986).
236. The personality, experience, training, and alertness of the negotiator have a
significant impact on the outcome of the bargaining process. See J. KOTTER, POWER
AND INFLUENCE 31-51 (1985); H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION
119-26 (1982); Fisher & Siegel, Evaluating Negotiation Behavior and Results: Can We
Identify What We Say We Know?, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 395 (1987); Spector, Negotiation
as a Psychological Process, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 607 (1977); Goleman, Influ-
encing Others: Skills are Identified, N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1986, at Cl, col. 1. The
teaching of negotiating skills to government and business leaders has become so popular
that educational computer software has emerged to help polish bargaining talents.
Sandberg-DiMent, How to Hone Negotiating Skills, N.Y. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, at F13,
col. 1. See also Thornton, Trial and Error: Courses Hone Government Lawyer's Skills,
Washington Post, Sept. 3, 1986, at A17, col. 2.
237. The study of negotiation as the practice of manipulation and advantage-seek-
Ing presents ethical dilemmas for the public sector negotiator. A public official may feel
a need to further the principles of democracy. In reality, however, the negotiator who is
always fair and open is at a disadvantage in the bargaining process. See text accompa-
nying note 209.
The facts of negotiating life are that puffing, exaggeration, misleading the other
side, and even lying are frequently encountered in the behavior of negotiators. The
heavy emphasis on the importance of the clever use of ploys in conducting negotia-
tions implies, at the very least, approval of the effort to distract, if not mislead, the
other side... The failure to note the low level of morality frequently... [encoun-
tered] at the bargaining table would create a gap in the preparation of the would-be
negotiator and leave him exposed in an area where ends tend to justify and dictate
the means.
B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 156 (1984). But see Lax & Stroud, Three
Ethical Issues in Negotiation, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 363 (1986).
Of course, the public official is always constrained in his use of deception by the
standards of conduct within the official's agency or organization. Recently, there has
been a greater effort within the federal government to establish higher standards of
personal conduct for public decisionmakers. If an official bargaining on behalf of a local
government is not inhibited by a similar code of conduct, there may be an imbalance at
the negotiating table. See A. NEELY, ETHICS-IN-GOVERNMENT LAWS: ARE THEY
Too "ETHICAL"? (1984). If the negotiator is a lawyer, the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility influences his role in the negotiation process. Steele, Deceptive Negotiating
and High-Toned Morality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1387 (1986).
238. One especially powerful tool of local governments is the discovery and ex-
ploitation of any federal agency action which is in violation of the agency's own rules
and regulations. See Raven-Hansen, Regulatory Estoppel. When Agencies Break Their
Own "Laws," 64 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1985). It is fairly common for cities to hire a Wash-
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B. Situational Opportunities Which Allow Local Governments to
Gain Negotiating Leverage Over Federal Agencies
1. Audience Scrutiny. In negotiations between local governments
and federal agencies, the size of the audience and its consequent scru-
tiny may affect federal agency decisionmaking2z 9 The larger the expo-
sure of the negotiations to outsiders, the greater the probability of the
federal official being inhibited in his actions. By using such tactics as a
press conference 40 or correspondence with key congressional repre-
sentatives, local governments may influence the outcome of the bar-
gaining."4 ' In addition, a local government may gain leverage by
combining allies. Thus, where other local governments, the state, or
special interest groups share a community's concerns, the federal
agency is forced to play to a larger audience and may be more concilia-
tory in its decisionmaking.
2. Careerism. Careerism, the desire of decisionmakers to advance
their careers by receiving high marks from their superiors, is a factor
that local government negotiators may use to their advantage.142 Ca-
reerism becomes a factor when the federal officer's conduct is exposed
to a larger audience which includes his superiors. The public official
whose career interests are thus engaged may react either by fighting
harder or by becoming reluctant to take chances to avoid fatal mis-
takes. The local government may gain an advantage if it exploits the
ington lobbyist to represent them in federal matters. Pelissero & England, State and
Local Governments' Washington "Reps": Lobbying Strategies and President Reagan's
New Federalism, 19 ST. & LOCAL GOV'T REV. 68 (1987).
239. See generally S. FRANTIZICH, WRITE YOUR CONGRESSMAN: CONSTITUENT
COMMUNICATIONS AND REPRESENTATION (1986); R. RIPLEY & G. FRANKLIN, CON-
GRESS, THE BUREAUCRACY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1980); Forester, Questioning and
Organization Attention: Toward a Critical Theory of Planning and Administrative Prac-
tice, 13 AD. & Soc'Y 161 (1981). For an example of how much exposure a federal
agency decisionmaking process can receive, see L. BACOW & M. WHEELER, ENVIRON-
MENTAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION 195-247 (1984).
240. See D. GRABER, MASS MEDIA AND AMERICAN POLITICS (1980).
241. H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 17 (1982). Audience
manipulation is a common tactic of negotiation. In most cases, it must be endured
because a reaction to it may be counterproductive. One defense, however, is to claim
bad faith because of the other party's attempts to bargain through pressure tactics
rather than on the merits. Further, negotiating positions can be hardened or scheduled
meetings rescheduled to demonstrate the counterproductiveness of a resort to this tac-
tic. See B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 169 (1984).
242. See generally, B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 59-62 (1984); J.
RUBIN & B. BROWN, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF BARGAINING AND NEGOTIATION
130 (1975).
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situation where the federal officer is inhibited by his exposure. By un-
derstanding careerism, a local government may gain an advantage by
contacting the federal decisionmaker's superior. This tactic may in-
duce favorable action in the negotiating process.
3. Linkage. An important advantage to a local government is the
opportunity to link a specific issue to another aspect of the relation-
ship.243 While many federal agencies are relatively independent, they
often must rely on the continuing support of local governments. For
example, in the area of land use control, federal agencies increasingly
depend on local governments to restrict private development near the
boundary of federal land. 2" These aspects of the local government-
federal agency relationship give local governments leverage in negotiat-
ing a reduction or elimination of development on federal property.
In a California case, a local government requested that a federal
agency comply with local building code regulations in the construction
of family housing on federal property. 45 The federal agency initially
refused to comply with the local ordinance, claiming immunity under
the Supremacy Clause. 46 However, the federal family housing project
depended on the local government approval of sewer hookups.2 47
When the community linked the issue of building code compliance
with the sewer hookup approval, the local government was able to ex-
ert considerable leverage over the federal decisionmakers.
4. Victim Role Playing. Often a less powerful party can turn its
weakness into a significant advantage. For example, the heavy-handed
use of federal power may be self-defeating when the local government
plays the role of the victim to an influential audience. 48 The key for
243. See R. COBB & C. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DY-
NAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING 112-24 (1972); Bacharach & Lawler, Power Dependence
and Power Paradoxes in Bargaining, 2 NEGOTIATION J. 167 (1986).
244. E.g., Hiscock, Protecting National Park System Buffer Zones: Existing, Pro-
posed, and Suggested Authority, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 35 (1986); Keiter, On Protect-
ing the National Parks From the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 355, 391-93 (1985); Pearlman & Waite, Controlling Land Use and Population
Growth Near Nuclear Power Plants, 27 WASH. U.J. URn & CONTEMP. L. 9 (1984);
Smollar, Bullet Train Seen Threat to Marine Base: Reports Say Route Would Disrupt
Training at Camp Pendleton, L.A. Times, Jan. 20, 1984, at 128, col. 1.
245. Jampoler, The Navy as Neighbor, PROCEEDINGS U.S. NAVAL INST., Sept.
1982, at 51.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See B. RAMUNDO, EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 41-42, 139-40 (1984). Defenses
to the victim-playing ploy are suggested in Kuechle, Negotiating With an Angry Public,
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local governments is to assure enough publicity to generate audience
pressure. The objective of victim role playing is to get the federal
agency to be especially accommodating of the local government's
needs.
5. Divide and Conquer. The federal government is especially sus-
ceptible to the exploitation of differences between federal agencies 249 or
between individuals within the agency. In such cases, a local gov-
ernment may gain leverage by recruiting allies from other agencies or
from individuals within the agency. This tactic is simplified by the
existence of disgruntled agency employees. As public organizations,
federal agencies are especially vulnerable to the cultivation of allies by
local governments.
CONCLUSION
Although it appears that federal agencies have exclusive control over
activities on federal property, there are legal, ethical, and political bar-
gaining factors which limit the discretion of federal decisionmakers.
These restrictions may be especially significant in those cases where
federal activities conflict with local community concerns. In many
such situations, federal law now directs federal land managers to recog-
nize and address conflicts with local governments. Moreover, the ethi-
cal posture of the particular federal officer, who may feel the need to be
democratic or fair, can play an important role in determining the
strength of the federal power.
Federal law and the ethical tendencies of the federal officer are only
two of many factors which may influence the final federal position. In
practice, federal agency land use decisions evolve from intra-agency
I NEGOTIATION J. 317 (1985). To counter the potential for public pressure through
victim role playing, many private and public agencies created public relations depart-
ments. See Hart, Public Relations for Public Approval, URBAN LAND, Feb. 1986, at 19;
Palmer, Uncle Sam's Ever-expanding P.R. Machine, Wall St. J., Jan. 10, 1985, at 26,
col. 3.
249. The tactic of pitting one federal agency against another is common where the
land use dispute involves environmental values. E.g., Fritiofson v. Alexander, 772 F.2d
1225, 1227-34, 1247 (5th Cir. 1985); Tarlock, The Endangered Species Act and Western
Water Rights, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1985).
250. See S. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM 27-29, 93-166 (1984)
(discussing the impact on federal agency decisionmaking of the NEPA interdisciplinary
approach requirement). The divide and conquer ploy is discussed in B. RAMUNDO,
EFFECTIVE NEGOTIATION 171-73 (1984).
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and inter-organizational negotiations. In this bargaining arena, federal
agencies are extremely vulnerable to pressure from an outside special
interest group, such as a local government. The degree of influence
which a local government asserts over a federal agency is directly re-
lated to the local government's skillful exploitation of these federal
agency vulnerabilities.
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